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This thesis seeks to explain if President Barack Obama’s efforts to reduce nuclear 
terrorism have had a meaningful impact. Key areas of observation include how well 
efforts have been implemented and how effectively the president has fostered domestic 
and international support. Early in his presidency, President Obama declared to the world 
that the United States would lead a concerted effort to reduce the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. Combined with the Nuclear Security Summits, the president’s efforts quickly 
established reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism as a top priority for his 
administration. Over the ensuing eight years, President Obama diligently supported 
nonproliferation measures by enhancing the domestic and international nonproliferation 
architecture. The president’s integrative approach wove nonproliferation efforts together 
that had, traditionally, not been used to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. The 
findings of this thesis indicate that most of the programs were successful but problems 
remain, particularly in areas linked to further arms reductions and international 
nonproliferation. The next president can further these efforts by continuing the integrative 
approach, crafting a more cooperative relationship with Congress and expanding threat 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to address the question: have the Obama administration’s many 
nonproliferation efforts actually reduced the threat of nuclear terrorism? These efforts 
include policies and programs geared at securing weapons-usable nuclear material, 
limiting terrorists’ access to existing nuclear weapons, and implementing nonproliferation 
programs specifically targeting nuclear terrorism.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Obama administration’s eight-year tenure offers a contemporary opportunity 
to assess U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Early in the President’s first term, he visited the 
Czech Republic and declared the threat of nuclear terrorism to be “the most immediate 
and extreme threat to global security.”1 This sentiment guided a series of nonproliferation 
endeavors to secure nuclear materials and reduce global nuclear weapons stockpiles. 
More recently the President opted to visit Hiroshima, Japan, in an effort to “offer a 
forward-looking vision focused on our shared future” and to promote his overall 
nonproliferation efforts.2 
Since 9/11, the threat of terrorism has become an influential consideration in the 
formation of national security policy; by extension, the threat has influenced ongoing and 
new nonproliferation measures aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.3 
Nonproliferation efforts have historically been a matter of concern between states; as 
such, they have been focused on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. However, in 
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered,” White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/remarks-president-
barack-obama-prague-delivered. 
2 Gardiner Harris, et al. “Obama to Be First Sitting President to Visit Hiroshima,” New York Times, 
May 10, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/us/politics/obama-hiroshima-visit.html?_r=0. 
3 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” 
International Atomic Energy Agency, November 2014, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/
nuclear-proliferation-and-potential-threat-nuclear-terrorism. 
 2 
spite of having promoted a global reduction in weapons, a significant number remains. 
Nuclear energy also continues to spread; a 2014 IAEA report identified 438 reactors 
currently operating and an additional 70 under construction.4 Combined with growing 
concern over the reach of terrorist organizations, the language of nonproliferation policies 
has once again become increasingly focused on the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
The Obama administration has approached this challenge by both adopting the 
existing suite of nonproliferation efforts left in place from the Bush administration and 
beginning a broad range of new ones. Understanding the effect of these efforts, as well as 
the manner in which they were managed, is key to understanding what methods may best 
address the problem. Identifying the cause and effect behind the administration is 
necessary to determine not just what has worked, but why. The resource requirements, 
impact on foreign and domestic politics, and security implications will assist in fine-
tuning future policies.     
As an aside, an important distinction must be made in order to more accurately 
explore causes for success or failure—who “owns” a program or policy. This thesis will 
examine select nonproliferation policies administered during the Obama administration in 
two broader categories. Those programs owned and administered by the United States 
and those owned by the United Nations. While programs like the Megaports initiative 
involve a great deal of international cooperation and diplomacy, they are ultimately a 
U.S.-owned program and are therefore under the direct control of the U.S. government. 
U.S. ownership implies a great deal more control over policy happenings, and therefore a 
greater responsibility for their effectiveness than programs owned by foreign bodies. 
C. THE ADMINISTRATION’S NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Beginning early in his administration, President Obama publically emphasized the 
threat of nuclear terrorism as a byproduct of existing weapons and poorly secured 
materials potentially accessible materials.5 U.S. efforts to secure nuclear materials would 
                                                 
4 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, (Vienna, Austria, 
IAEA, 2015), 11, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/rds2-35web-85937611.pdf. 
5 Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered.”  
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become a major effort for the administration. Marrying new programs, like the Four-Year 
Effort and the Nuclear Security Summits, with existing ones the President approached the 
issue of nuclear terrorism directly and early. This style captured his belief that the U.S. 
should take a “leading role in supporting a just and sustainable international order.”6 It 
also came to define the administration’s approach to nonproliferation abroad. It also 
provided an opportunity to refocus attention on the initial goal of zero nuclear weapons. 
The President’s policies placed great emphasis on diplomatic means that could be 
pursued with minimal congressional interference.7  
Inviting the world to the table, President Obama has attempted to enlist support 
from the full gamut of political ideologies. Fundamentally, nonproliferation goals have 
found common ground between realists and idealists; however, the perceived nature of 
nonproliferation measures and their effects differ—realists highlight the practical role of 
material and technology controls while idealists see nonproliferation measures as a means 
for establishing international normative values eschewing nuclear weapons.8  
Viewed through a constructivist lens, however, the global nonproliferation regime 
is an attempt to codify normative nuclear behavior with a legal framework, vis-a-vis the 
United Nations. This constructivist approach would hold that whatever the origin of their 
perspectives, actors are significantly influenced by “social relationships” and shared 
social practices.9 Leveraging this theoretical framework, however, has been one of the 
most significant hurdles for the Obama administration. It has been a constant balance 
between preserving the U.S. nuclear arsenal’s strategic value and aspirations for a 
nuclear-weapons-free world.  
                                                 
6 2010 National Security Strategy, The White House, May 2010, 17, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
7 2015 National Security Strategy, The White House, February 2015, 1,  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
8 James E. C. Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field,” The 
Nonprolfieration Review 13, no. 2 (2006): 457–8, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/
10736700601071397.   
9 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 73, 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC124/PSC124Readings/WendtConstructivism.pdf. 
 4 
D. U.S.-LED NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS 
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, the primary U.S. 
governmental agent for nuclear security matters, has been one of the key federal entities 
in the administration’s nonproliferation efforts. The Global Material Security (GMS) 
program—formed in 2016 as part of an organizational restructuring—would capture 
priorities of work from the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the Nuclear 
Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) program and select priorities from the 
nonproliferation and international security programs.10 Formed in 2004, the GTRI has 
played a significant role supporting the stated objectives of the Four-Year Effort. Its 
primary focus is to secure or reduce vulnerable nuclear materials globally.11  
Coupled with the Four-Year Effort’s material security aims the administration 
would sponsor a biennial Nuclear Security Summit to “set new standards, expand our 
cooperation with Russia, [and] pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive 
materials.”12 Primarily a mechanism to promote discourse and raise awareness on nuclear 
material security among the global audience, the Summits would involve 56 delegations 
and provide a means for states to elaborate on their own efforts to secure material.13  
The NSDD program, formerly Second Line of Defense (SLD), is focused on the 
detection of nuclear material, domestically and abroad. Beginning in 1998 as a 
mechanism to assist Russia, and by extension the United States, it was aimed at detecting 
                                                 
10 Greg Terrn and Sarah Tully, “Factsheet: FY2016 Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Program 
Restructuring Explained,” The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, February 23, 2015, 
http://armscontrolcenter.org/factsheet-fy-2016-defense-nuclear-non-proliferation-program-restructuing-
explaine/. 
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Made Progress to 
Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Efforts, (GAO-15-
799)(Washington, DC: Sep 2015), 8. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672703.pdf. 
12 Piet de Klerk, “The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and its Contribution to the 
Nonproliferation Regime,” The Nonproliferation Review 21, no. 3-4 (2014): 412, 
http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10736700.2015.1040232.  
13 de Klerk, “The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit,” 416. 
 5 
and deterring nuclear smuggling.14 It has, however, evolved into a far more expansive 
program that involves domestic border security, such as the Megaports Initiative.15  
Another carry over program established under the Bush administration is the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was established in 2003 in order to counter the 
trafficking of WMD and related materials.16 Early in his administration the President 
endorsed the PSI, suggesting it should become a “durable international institution,” as it 
is currently more of an “activity” than an organization.17 Like the PSI, the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is a voluntary organization composed 
of 86 states with the goal of, “strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and 
respond to nuclear terrorism.”18 It has afforded the Obama administration an outlet to 
address nuclear terrorism at an operational level by supporting events aimed at sharing 
best practices and increasing awareness on the broader threat of nuclear terrorism.19   
Nuclear cooperation agreements, known as the 123 agreements for their section of 
origin within the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, codify the nature of U.S. 
international nuclear technology sales and transfers. Approval of all 123 programs, as 
outlined in the AEA, requires submittal to the President for review and approval and 
                                                 
14 L. Cantuti and L. Thomas, “Second Line of Defense Program,” Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, (Phoenix, AZ: The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 1999), https://e-reports-
ext.llnl.gov/pdf/236545.pdf. 
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative 
Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges, (GAO-13-37) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2012), 4, http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649759.pdf. 
16 U.S. Department of State, Proliferation Security Initiative, accessed on April 28, 2016, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm. 
17 Jacek Durkalaec, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects,” Non-
Proliferation Papers, no. 16 (June 2012): 1, http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/
publications/nonproliferation-paper-16. 
18 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, “Overview,” Accessed 29 April, 2016, 
http://www.gicnt.org/. 
19 Matthew Bunn et al., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous 
Decline, (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Kennedy School, 2016), 68, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web.pdf. 
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review by Congress.20 The nuances of each agreement offer insight into the 
administration’s efforts at controlling nuclear materials. For example, the new 123 
agreement with the UAE included a nonproliferation “gold standard” clause that barred 
any future enrichment or reprocessing. Vietnam and Jordon, however, rejected such 
constraints.21 Nuclear cooperation agreements offer insight into how far the 
administration is willing to trust participatory nations with the same nuclear materials it is 
attempting to secure. 
E. INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS 
International nonproliferation efforts administered to by international agencies 
have been valuable opportunities for the Obama administration’s efforts to secure nuclear 
materials. On the one hand, they offer a multilateral approach that legitimizes U.S. 
endeavors and helps to avoid, or lessen, accusations of ulterior motivations. On the other 
hand, they often challenge the administration’s ability to pursue diplomatic objectives 
when confronted with political resistance at home.  
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the centerpiece 
of the nonproliferation regime and has near unanimous support from the global 
community. Emphasizing the NPT’s call to disarm in Article VI, President Obama has 
voiced his support of the treaty as a means of conveying his broader commitment to 
pursue “a world without nuclear weapons.”22 However, tensions exist between U.S. 
nonproliferation policies and international pressures for the United States to move toward 
disarmament. Like previous administrations, Obama tried to thread the needle between 
promoting nonproliferation and maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.  
The Administration’s inability to gain Senate consent for the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a good example of this tension. Widely viewed internationally as a 
                                                 
20 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended, P, P.L. 83–703, 68 Stat. 919, 59, 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1327/ML13274A489.pdf#page=23. 
21 Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement: Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R43433) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2014), 10, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43433.pdf. 
22 Obama, “Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered.”  
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major symbol of weapon-state progress on disarmament, the CTBT illustrates the 
administration’s inability to sway domestic-U.S. decision makers. As of May 2016 it 
remains signed but unratified.23 The CTBT is currently operating 321 monitoring stations 
globally; consequently, even in the absence of major actors like the United States, it 
provides the greater international community an awareness of possible nuclear weapons 
tests.24 
Also predating the Obama administration, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 provides a legally binding framework requiring states to 
“adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting activities involving the proliferation of 
WMD and their means of delivery to non-state actors.”25 Like the GICNT, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) 
covers a range of matters regarding nuclear terrorism and legal requirements participatory 
states must pursue. Opened in 2005 and entering into force in 2007, it provided an 
opportunity for the UN to address perceived gaps in the international legal framework 
regarding nuclear terror.26 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (CPPNM) (with its 2005 amendment) requires states to secure domestic 
stockpiles of nuclear material in sites or at facilities as well as during transit.27 By 
championing these treaties, the Obama Administration has hoped to reinforce its broader 
nonproliferation aims and reinforce its conviction in the eyes of the global audience.  
                                                 
23 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Status of Signature and Ratification,” Vienna, 
Austria, Accessed April 25, 2016, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/. 
24 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Overview of the Verification Regime,” Vienna, 
Austria, accessed May 17, 2016, https://www.ctbto.org/verification-regime/background/overview-of-the-
verification-regime/. 
25 U.S. Department of State, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Bureau of International 
Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), accessed April 29, 2016, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm. 
26 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism,” (Washington, DC: NTI, 2016), http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/international-
convention-suppression-acts-nuclear-terrorism/. 




F. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In an effort to understand the nonproliferation policies and programs employed 
during the Obama administration’s tenure, this literature review address three broad 
perspectives on the administration’s efforts. Each perspective holds that the President’s 
nonproliferation efforts have had an impact on the threat of nuclear terrorism, but they 
vary in regard to the degree of success and the reasons for failures or difficulties in 
implementation. One perspective holds that security conditions have improved as a result 
of nonproliferation measures but failed appeals to Congress and recent budget cuts may 
undermine future potential. Another hypothesis is that nonproliferation successes and 
failures have been tied largely to the administration’s ability to leverage international 
support through effective diplomacy. A third perspective is that some nonproliferation 
programs have faced challenges during implementation that have undermined their 
successes: such as, the practicalities of enforcement, unforeseen logistical burdens, or an 
inability to accurately gauge a program’s effectiveness.  
1. Domestic Politics and Budgets 
Since 2009, the President’s nonproliferation policy has successfully advanced the 
cause of nuclear security; however, authors highlight how the difficulties of maintaining 
domestic political approval and recent changes in funding suggest an unwillingness to 
sustain the support necessary for continued success. It is important to note, however, that 
both the budgeting and program approval is greatly influenced by the interplay between 
the executive branch and Congress. Critical of the administration’s efforts, Nickolas Roth 
echoes this challenge and emphasizes how disputes within Congress—as to whether 
crimes captured in the CPPNM should merit the death penalty—have delayed passage of 
the legislation.28 Emphasizing the impact of the intergovernmental delay, Roth suggests 
                                                 
28 Nickolas Roth, “Congress Gives Thumbs Up to International Nuclear Security Conventions,” 




that in the context of the administration’s broader nonproliferation message the failure to 
ratify the CPPNM was an “embarrassment” to the United States.29   
In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, U.S.–Vietnam Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress, Mary Beth Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark 
Manyin’s provide a study on the challenges of implementing a 123 agreement, and how, 
in spite of addressing practices with foreign partners, it remains powerfully influenced by 
domestic politics.30 Successful creation and implementation of a 123 agreement offers a 
valuable waypoint for success as it reflects an ability to balance domestic security 
concerns with economic interests. In another CRS report, Mary Beth Nikitin and Amy 
Woolf highlighted this challenge again as the administration attempted to pursue a 
renewal of the CTR. Differences within the House and Senate over continued CTR 
funding—albeit reduced and under a more limited agreement—faced stiff resistance in 
light of Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine.31 Rachael Oswald captures this impact in a 
quote from Senator John McCain; assessing the future of U.S.–Russian cooperation, the 
Arizona Republican suggests, “When they’re not cooperating, why should we waste the 
money on something we can’t get done?” This sentiment manifested in a FY16 defense 
spending bill provision that would ban funds for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation work.32 
Although President Obama vetoed the bill its existence captured the discord between 
legislators’ perceptions of ongoing CTR work and the administration’s greater 
nonproliferation objectives.33 Similarly critical, Amanda Moodie and Michael Moodie 
highlight that—in spite of the Obama administration’s efforts over the last eight years—
                                                 
29 Roth, “Congress Gives Thumbs Up to International Nuclear Security Conventions.” 
30 Nikitin, Holt, and Manyin, U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 12. 
31 Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues 
for Congress (CRS Report No. R43143) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 8, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf. 
32 Rachel Oswald, “Chill With Russia Brings Nuclear Insecurity,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis 
Reporting, (November 20, 2015). http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/chill-russia-brings-nuclear-insecurity 
33 Ibid.  
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weapons and technology have continued to proliferate and known instances of 
noncompliance have been addressed ineffectively, if at all.34  
Concerning funding, some authors consider poor fiscal management and the 
absence of long-term budgeting to have undermined programmatic efficiency. Critical of 
ongoing spending trends, a GAO report argues that–in the case of the Megaports 
Initiative—the failure to formulate long-term sustainability plans has undermined the 
initiative’s long-term viability.35 Amy Woolf and Mary Beth Nikitin, in The Evolution of 
Cooperative Threat Reduction, argue that funding patterns can be related to a program 
having completed its objectives—and funding is understandably reduced or halted.36 
Conversely, some programs may have failed to settle the international agreements 
necessary for work to move forward, and funding reductions are based off of perceptions 
of programmatic failure.37 Woolf and Nikitin do, however, note that evolving U.S. 
perceptions of the nuclear terror threat have also been an important determinant of 
funding levels and have impacted the willingness to support certain programs.38 
Advocates of strengthened nonproliferation measures, Matthew Bunn, Nickolas 
Roth, and William H. Toby argue that many of the administration’s nonproliferation 
successes have been tied to funding that appears to be tapering off, and therefore some 
programs and policies may not enjoy similar gains amidst fiscal limitations.39 Based on 
annual budgets reflecting a decrease in gross funding for nonproliferation measures, there 
                                                 
34 Amanda Moodie and Michael Moodie, “Alternative Narratives for Arms Control: Bringing 
Together Old and New,” The Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 2 (2010): 302, http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2010.485430.  
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative, 28. 
36 Nikitin and Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 15. 
37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Ibid., 5. 
39 Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, Cutting Too Deep: The Obama 
Administration’s Proposal for Nuclear Security Spending Reductions, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2014), 5, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/24409/cutting_too_deep.html. 
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is a growing sense that future nonproliferation efforts may be at risk.40 Equally 
concerned with funding decreases, Bunn et al., in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: 
Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline, suggest that the ending of the “era of 
the nuclear summit” should not result in a decreased willingness to protect the United 
States against nuclear terrorism.41 Achieving congressional support has been a challenge 
for the administration, both as a means of promoting a broader nonproliferation culture 
and securing the funding necessary to maintain a breadth of programs and policies.   
2. International Factors 
According to certain authors, the administration’s successes have often been tied 
to concerted efforts of diplomacy; conversely, they argue, shortfalls and programmatic 
gaps have been the result of a failure to reach consensus on the purpose and value of CTR 
type programs. Good diplomacy is necessary to develop and maintain an effective 
nonproliferation regime with audiences abroad. Achieving both political and economic 
buy-in requires compromises that some decision makers may be unwilling to make.42 
The right political influence can help to overcome these reservations, and is frequently 
the key to incentivize actions—be it negative or positive incentives—that is necessary to 
facilitate change.   
A similar exercise in diplomacy, the CTR program was the product of U.S. 
concern over nuclear security following the collapse of the Soviet Union and required 
extensive dialogue with the leadership of the Russian Federation.43 Critical of U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts, Sharon Weiner argues that the trust necessary to effectively 
execute the CTR program was undermined from the beginning because “the United 
States appeared to treat Russia as a defeated adversary of whom advantage could be 
                                                 
40 Bunn, Roth, and Tobey, Cutting Too Deep, 18. 
41 Matthew Bunn et al., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. 3. 
42 Matthew Bunn, et al., Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-
Russia Joint Threat Assessment (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
September 2013), 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/JTA%20eng%20web2.pdf. 
43 Nikitin and Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 1. 
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taken.”44 The result was an institutionalized reluctance—on both sides—to develop 
strong relationships between participants at higher levels of government in order to 
facilitate program objectives.45  
Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf propose that in spite of years of 
successful threat reduction activities, Russia’s unwillingness to renew the CTR 
agreement was primarily the result of its increased ability to handle security matters 
without U.S. assistance.46 With Russia possessing one of the world’s largest stockpiles of 
weapons-grade fissile material, events like those in the Ukraine undermine trust and 
hinder CTR efforts. The CTR program has, however, expanded beyond its initial scope 
and focus on Russia to include the Middle East and North Africa.47 A supporter of 
ongoing CTR efforts, Author Mary Kaszynski advocates this expanding mission-set by 
demonstrating the program’s historic value; she also addresses problems that result from 
the program’s aging legal framework but suggests that with proper leadership the 
program can continue to be effective.48  
As with the CTR experience, Nikitin illustrates in a CRS report how the PSI’s 
successes have been tied to an ability to facilitate the exchange of information among 
states by securing “formal or informal cooperation by Western Hemisphere countries.”49 
Also like CTR, the program faces challenges, such as how to integrate nonparticipating 
nations, like China, and how cooling U.S.–Russian relations may influence program 
                                                 
44 Sharon K. Weiner, Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Expertise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 300. 
45 Ibid., 301.  
46 Nikitin and Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 7. 
47 Ibid., 16. 
48 Mary Kaszynski, “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Securing and 
Safeguarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” American Security Project, (Washington, DC: 2012), 
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200068%20-%20The%20Nunn-
Lugar%20Cooperative%20Threat%20Reduction%20Program.pdf. 
49 Mary Beth Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (CRS Report No. 
RL34227)(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 10, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
RL34327.pdf. 
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effectiveness.50 Although a proponent of the administration’s overall efforts—
particularly the use of the PSI as a dynamic mechanism to address the proliferation 
problem—William Wohlforth critiques the administration’s ability to meet his broader 
zero-nuke agenda suggesting any impact to “hegemonic prerogatives” would be 
unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole.51  
Proponents of threat reduction programs Matthew Bunn, Valentin Kuznetsov, 
Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, 
and Pavel S. Zolotarev emphasize Russia’s willingness—as captured in its National 
Security Strategy—to cooperate in some nonproliferation matters.52 This assessment was, 
however, conducted prior to Russian military intervention in Ukraine and may therefore 
be a less relevant indicator for diplomatic opportunities today. Amy Woolf expands on 
the diplomatic challenges U.S. and Russia face by highlighting a Department of State 
report confirming Russian violations of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty.53  
Opponents of the administration’s methods, Kim R. Holmes and James Jay 
Carafanno, raise concerns over the administration’s exchanges with the UN and how 
ultimately they often lack substantive results or “hard policy.”54 Their critique proposes a 
valuable question—one that will be an important metric in Chapter IV of this work—
have the administration’s diplomatic efforts yielded any practical changes?    
                                                 
50 Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative, 8. 
51 William C. Wohlforth, “US Leadership and the Limits of International Institutional Change,” 
International Journal 67, no. 2 (April 2012): 421, http://libproxy.nps.edu/
login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1267028996?accountid=12702. 
52 Bunn, et al., Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 15. 
53 Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions (CRS Report No. 
R41219) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 6, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
R41219.pdf.Woolf. 
54 Kim R. Holmes and James Jay Carafano, “Defining the Obama Doctrine, Its Pitfalls, and How to 
Avoid Them,” The Heritage Foundation, September 1, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2010/08/defining-the-obama-doctrine-its-pitfalls-and-how-to-avoid-them. 
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3. Implementation  
A third perspective within the literature argues that during the implementation of 
some nonproliferation efforts there have been unforeseen difficulties that undermine 
overall success. Difficulties may include the unanticipated logistical burdens, an inability 
to accurately gauge a program’s effectiveness, or the unwillingness of a state to enforce 
nonproliferation measures domestically—i.e., a state’s failure to act on UNSCR 1540 
provisions. For example, Bunn, Roth, and Tobey highlight how U.S. efforts to secure 
hundreds of kilograms of Japanese nuclear material may incur an escalating cost-burden 
not fully accounted for in the program’s initial funding allotment.55 While challenges like 
this may not undermine the fundamental security gains achieved by consolidating 
materials, they suggest the role played by anticipated unexpected crises and problems.  
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
DOE Made Progress to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, but 
Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Efforts, critical of the Department of Energy’s 
methods, argues that the agency has failed to collect accurate data on the quantity and 
disposition of certain nuclear material stockpiles, thus undermining material security 
efforts.56 In another GAO report, David Trimble suggests the lack of follow-up 
inspections for sensitive material sites abroad–in order to determine if materials are being 
stored according to international guidelines–has resulted in a failure to capture potential 
security threats.57 Following through after a program has begun has been a frequent 
challenge to the effectiveness of U.S. efforts; it has presented a significant and 
reoccurring challenge to meeting the administration’s objectives. Faced with securing 
materials globally, U.S. federal agencies have had to contend with the difficulties of 
moving or securing materials while adhering to regional political, economic, and security 
related challenges. 
                                                 
55 Bunn, Roth, and Tobey, Cutting Too Deep, 18. 
56 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Made Progress to 
Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, 20. 
57 David C. Trimble, National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on Management 
Challenges and Steps Taken to Address Them, (GAO-15-532T)(Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2015), 12, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669668.pdf. 
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In Peddling Peril, David Albright examines Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan’s efforts 
to proliferate nuclear technology and how, due to poorly conceived or enforced export 
controls, he was often able to do so legally.58 Albright argues that implementation gaps 
in existing nonproliferation measures remain, most critically in enforcement, and as a 
result nuclear terrorism remains a serious threat.59 He extends this concern to UNSCR 
1540 and how the United States has approached the lack of strong enforcement 
provisions; however, he is more critical of some foreign states and their unwillingness to 
follow through with agreed upon nonproliferation measures.60  
Kaegan McGrath and Vasileios Savvidis offer a similar critique of UNSCR 1887 
in “UNSC Resolution 1887: Packaging Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the United 
Nations.” They argue that UNSCR 1887 provides a mechanism to reaffirm commitments, 
but lacks any legal framework that could promote states to take more substantive 
measures.61  
Assessing success may, itself, become a problem during the implementation 
process of any nonproliferation program. Sharon Wiener argues that some programs have 
used metrics—developed at their inception or identified as the program evolved—that 
may not have necessarily displayed a strong causal relationship.62 Her critique covers the 
implementation of programs beginning around 1991; however, with some critiques still 
an issue as of 2008 they have been subsequently inherited by the Obama 
administration.63 A GAO report, Combating Nuclear Smuggling, has a similar critique of 
the Megaport Initiative’s ongoing efforts and how, in spite of the program being well 
underway, current measures of success are based on the amount of work being 
                                                 
58 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, (New 
York: Free Press, 2010), 248. 
59 Ibid., 245. 
60 Ibid., 248.  
61 Kaegan McGrath and Vasileios Savvidis, “UNSC Resolution 1887: Packaging Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament at the United Nations,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 1, 2009, http://www.nti.org/
analysis/articles/unsc-resolution-1887/. 
62 Weiner, Our Own Worst Enemy, 214. 
63 Ibid., 302. 
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conducted–dollars spent, laborers employed, and technology sold–rather than the work’s 
actual impact on reducing nuclear smuggling.64 The administration’s ability to manage 
these programs, or more accurately how they direct the managers, offers insight into their 
broader nonproliferation aims.        
G. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The initial hypothesis of this work is that the administration began and sustained a 
strong nonproliferation effort; however, emerging problems—challenges cooperating 
with actors abroad and the difficulties of effective implementation—have negatively 
affected some current and future nonproliferation efforts.  
The administration’s Nuclear Security Summit Series provided an opportunity for 
the President to promote multilateral action and reinforce his own nonproliferation 
objectives. Through the effective use of diplomacy, the President brought about a 
renewed focus on nonproliferation; subsequently, there has been an increased willingness 
by international players to entertain compromise—be it the release of materials, increased 
funding, or the ratification of existing nonproliferation measures–in the realm of nuclear 
security.65 Increased funding to threat reduction programs from the start of the 
administration until very recently, have provided a tangible backdrop to the 
administration’s overarching nonproliferation focus. Reducing the threat of nuclear 
terrorism through enhanced nuclear security—by consolidating materials domestically or 
securing them abroad—was embraced by many as a reasonable means of approaching the 
threat.  
Shortfalls have, however, presented challenges to the President’s overall efforts. 
The administration’s effort to achieve compromise has been challenging; moreover, as 
international actors pursue their own interests the administration must attempt to balance 
relations—with allies and adversaries—with its broader nonproliferation agenda. For 
example, India and Pakistan continue to pursue security by way of nuclear deterrence and 
                                                 
64 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative, 30. 
65 Nuclear Security Summit, “2016 Progress Reports,” accessed October 17, 2016, 
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are unlikely to cease their efforts in spite of the President’s broader call for arms 
reductions.66 The administration has called for restraint but—in light of their reluctance 
to compromise—must weigh national security interests in light of their growing 
stockpiles of weapons usable materials. Similarly, U.S. tension with China and Russia 
has undermined cooperative efforts on nuclear safety and security matters.  
H. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The central design of this thesis will be a review of select nonproliferation 
policies during the Obama administration’s tenure. Similar to the Arms Control 
Association’s 2013 Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 
this thesis looks to use a report-card format in an effort to assess the administration’s 
nonproliferation efforts.67 The report card will cover efforts and results from January 
2009 through April 2016 and will provide an assessment on their effectiveness in 
reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. The rationale behind the report-card format is to 
provide a consolidated view of the administration’s nonproliferation programs and 
highlight the net effect of these efforts. The report card will offer an A-through-F grading 
scheme providing a narrative explanation of the grades supported by in-chapter evidence. 
Key areas for consideration that will be applied broadly to each program and 
policy are: has the administration adequately fostered support within the United States to 
promote the President’s greater nonproliferation agenda; has the administration achieved 
a shift in behavior and practice by foreign states as a result of effective international 
diplomacy; have programs and polices been implemented and managed effectively—
promoting and achieving goal oriented strategies while emphasizing efficient spending.  
                                                 
66 Theodore Kalionzes and Kaegan McGrath, “Obama’s Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament 
Agenda: Building Steam or Losing Traction,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2010, http://www.nti.org/
analysis/articles/obamas-nuclear-agenda/. 
67 Kelsey Davenport and Marcus Taylor, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, April 2013) https://www.armscontrol.org/files/
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I. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE  
The thesis is arranged into five chapters. Following this introduction, the second 
chapter addresses U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies. The third chapter 
addresses U.S.-backed international nonproliferation programs. The fourth chapter 
presents an analysis and a consolidated score card on the Obama administration’s efforts. 
The fifth and final chapter offers a conclusion and path forward based on the data 
presented. 
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II. U.S.-LED NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS UNDER THE 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
In an effort to combat nuclear terrorism the Obama administration has leveraged a 
number of programs and policies. This chapter explores how the Obama administration 
leveraged U.S.-led nonproliferation efforts and what was their impact on nuclear 
terrorism. Select programs and policies will be observed with specific consideration 
given to the following themes: how effectively the programs and policies were 
implemented; if the administration was capable of rallying domestic support for 
nonproliferation measures; if the administration achieved consensus from the 
international community.  
In pursuit of the more focused aim of combating nuclear terrorism the 
administration sought to tie together existing material control, arms control, and 
disarmament efforts. Some programs had a long history of controlling materials and 
weapons in an effort to deny them to rouge states or nuclear-terrorists. Other programs, 
however, include arms control or commercial nuclear activities, but offered the 
administration an opportunity to incorporate its broader message of the threat of nuclear 
terrorism into the wider nonproliferation regime. Of those efforts this chapter will 
examine the following: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Second Line of Defense, 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 
and the Nuclear Security Summits. President Obama’s pursuit of a strengthened 
nonproliferation regime began early in his presidency. During his speech in the Czech 
Republic he would establish ambitious goals aimed at enhancing global nuclear security. 
A. THE FOUR-YEAR EFFORT  
On April 5, 2009, President Obama spoke to the Czech people in Prague about 
nuclear security. Alongside his aspirations of a nuclear-weapon free world, he 
highlighted the threat of nuclear terrorism and how he intended to mitigate that threat by 
securing “all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.”68 The 
                                                 
68 Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered.” 
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“Four-Year Effort” would evolve from the President’s speech. The effort itself would 
never coalesce into a formal department or office of any shape, but would become a 
rallying call to enhance existing measures aimed at combating nuclear terrorism. The 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
were reinvigorated by the resulting publicity and increased funding. Efforts like the 
Second line of Defense and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism also 
received increased support.     
From the beginning, the administration avoided a detailed list of exactly what was 
expected to occur within the four years. The administration did not establish any specific 
objectives and generally allowed federal agencies to establish their own subordinate 
objectives.69 The programs discussed include: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI); the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program; the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 
(CTR); the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS). As the Four-Year Effort came to a close, 
however, it would become apparent that the President’s goal would need more time.70  
Critics have argued that the plan was not ambitious enough, did not firmly 
establish goals, or failed to look inward. A break-in at the Y-12 Nuclear Security 
Complex in 2012 by three nuclear protestors undermined U.S. progress at a time when 
the administration was promoting global nuclear security.71 Nuclear material security 
was the cornerstone of the Four-Year Effort. Key in meeting the President’s goals and 
securing nuclear material, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, would be a critical 
component of the Four-Year Effort.  
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B. GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE (GTRI) 
The Global Threat Reduction Initiative has played an important supporting role in 
securing vulnerable nuclear material around the world. Created in 2004 by the NNSA, the 
GTRI’s mission has focused on “converting research reactors and isotope production 
facilities from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the use of low enriched uranium 
(LEU); removing or confirming the disposition of excess nuclear and radiological 
materials; and protecting high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft.”72 
Each of GTRI’s three pillars (remove, protect, convert) has supported the President’s 
broader efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.73  
Since 2004, GTRI has taken important steps toward securing materials and 
preventing access by would-be nuclear terrorists. The initiative has offered both the Bush 
and Obama administrations an “action agent” that can enhance nuclear security 
domestically and abroad. The 2005 Bratislava Agreement, between U.S. President Bush 
and Russian President Putin, launched a working group aimed at developing and 
eventually providing security assistance to Russian nuclear energy facilities and storage 
sites.74 The agreement offered a political framework in which members of the senior 
leadership—the U.S. Secretary of Energy and the Director of Russia’s federal energy 
apparatus, Rosatom, respectively—could direct GTRI activities.75 In time, GTRI would 
expand beyond its initial focus on securing Russian materials. During the second Bush 
administration, GTRI would remove at-risk materials from five countries.76 Other 
activities would include promoting the production of medical isotopes using methods that 
did not require HEU and the recovery of roughly 750 radioisotope thermoelectric 
                                                 
72 National Nuclear Security Administration, “GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats,” accessed April 29, 
2016, https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/reducingthreats.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Richard Weitz, Russian-American Security Cooperation after St. Petersburg: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007, 20, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub775.pdf. 
75 Ibid., 27.  
76 National Nuclear Security Administration, “GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats.”  
 22 
generators (RTGs) globally.77 As an established federal nuclear material security 
program, GTRI would play an important role in the Obama administration’s material 
security goals.  
1. Implementation  
Removing or securing nuclear materials abroad has been the cornerstone of the 
administration’s nonproliferation efforts since taking office in 2009. The GTRI became a 
critical action agent of the President’s stated goals. In support of the Four-Year Effort, the 
program has done the following: secured or removed almost 3,000 kg of HEU and 
plutonium globally; secured 10,000 kg of HEU and 3,000 kg of plutonium from 
Kazakhstan’s BN-350 reactor—a project that had begun prior to GTRI’s inception but 
was completed by GTRI in 2010; and completely removed the HEU and/or plutonium 
stockpiles from 11 countries.78 Manufacturing a weapon takes only a few kilograms of 
plutonium or roughly 30 kg of HEU.79 The roughly 16,000 kg of material—the bulk of 
which was secured within the U.S. or repatriated to Russia—equates to hundreds of 
potential nuclear explosive devices. Efforts have continued since 2013, the DOE has 
removed an additional 134 kg of HEU and plutonium in 2014 and have scheduled the 
removal of an additional 1,029 kg from sites by 2019.80 In addition to securing material 
and transporting it to domestic storage sites, if there is significant confidence in an origin 
state’s capabilities, GTRI may opt to secure the material abroad. Where possible, GTRI 
representatives pursue security by identifying sites in the material’s country of origin or 
reprocessing the material into “a form that is not susceptible to use in a WMD.”81 
Converting power facilities and moving industry away from weapons grade materials is 
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also a function of GTRI. Converting reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
has been a viable and generally accepted alternative to decommissioning power facilities. 
During the Four-Year Effort, GTRI converted 23 foreign reactors from HEU to LEU.82 
In many cases, the nuclear material of concern is of Russian or U.S. origin—the product 
of earlier commercial sales. In the case of U.S. material, the repatriation process is 
facilitated by preexisting agreements, often the same agreement that guided the initial 
transaction—called “123” agreements, they will be addressed later in this work. GTRI 
has also provided the administration a means of removing materials from countries not 
included in existing threat reduction programs– often referred to as “gap material.”83 
Identifying and securing gap material has been an important component of the 
administration’s Four-Year Effort. Generally found in smaller amounts, the parent nation 
may not possess the monetary or technical resources to adequately secure the material.  
The Obama administration’s strong position on nuclear security—coupled with a 
steady climb in funding early on (see Figure 1)—empowered the GTRI to be an effective 
instrument of change. However, two concerns over the program’s future potential have 
arisen. First, since the end of the Four-Year Effort, a steady decrease in funding 
suggested an unwillingness to sustain material security efforts. Second, managerial 
shortfalls may have detracted from the initiative’s full potential and left materials 
unsecured.  
In order to continue securing materials as effectively as the Four-Year Effort, the 
administration must ensure adequate funds are available. Within the administration, some 
counter-argue that declining nonproliferation budgets are a reflection of programmatic 
successes and initiatives winding down.84 Critics, however, highlight a pattern of 
dwindling nonproliferation funding as inconsistent with the administration’s outward 
concern over nuclear terrorism and contradictory in the face of an increasing nuclear 
weapons budget—Figure 1 illustrates GTRI funding trends up to the FY2017 proposed 
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budget.85 Budget reductions become especially worrisome when considering the 
increasing expense of recovering and securing nuclear materials. From its inception to 
2013, GTRI efforts have removed roughly 5,060 kg of weapons grade material from 
foreign sites—excluding the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan which, although finishing in 
2010, began before GTRI itself existed.86 For comparison, the Four-Year Effort removed 
or secured roughly 3,000 kg of nuclear materials—leaving 2,060 kg removed or secured 
in preceding four years. Based off DOE budgeting allotment, the resulting cost was 
approximately $0.25 million USD per kilogram of material secured in the four years 
preceding the Obama administration, and roughly $0.56 million USD per kilogram of 
material secured during the administration’s first four years—during the Four-Year 
Effort. Earlier efforts may have capitalized on the low-hanging fruit (i.e., efforts like the 
2005 Czech material recovery or the broader Reduce Enrichment for Research and Test 
Reactor (RERTR) program that worked closely with Russian-origin materials).87 Many 
of the Four-Year Effort’s recovery missions include relatively small amounts of nuclear 
material—often not enough to make a single weapon. Therefore, a realistic planning 
consideration should be the increasing cost of recovery, and if similar recovery efforts are 
to be continued, a corresponding increase in funding. Although the program’s successes 
have eliminated the amount of unsecured material, the expansion of nuclear energy 
around the world will undoubtedly be accompanied by an increasing demand for nuclear 
materials. The need to promote effective global nuclear security practices is important to 
avoid continued material security initiatives and the further allocation of U.S. resources.   
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Figure 1.  Nonproliferation Program Funding Trends88 
GTRI efforts have recovered a substantial amount of material without incident; 
however, the program’s overall success has been hindered by managerial shortfalls. 
There remains an estimated one million kilograms of HEU and plutonium existing 
outside the United States. Much of this material, roughly 737,000 kg,89 resides in Russia 
and is considered secure, but nuclear security experts warn that Russia’s economic 
downturn and an increasingly destabilized region are likely to have a negative impact on 
Russian nuclear security.90 Securing materials is an important measure aimed at reducing 
terrorist access; however, it is as important that the “right” materials are secured. Critics 
of ongoing GTRI efforts argue that the DOE has not completed an inventory of U.S.-
origin material in overseas sites nor have they visited some sites in over 20 years to 
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confirm U.S. origin material is being secured appropriately—ultimately less than one-
tenth of all the U.S. origin material could be located.91 When asked by the GAO, an 
employee within the Office of Nonproliferation was unable to determine who was 
eligible for GTRI fuel-return assistance because no list of U.S. overseas inventory 
existed.92 A failure to fully account for U.S.-origin material bodes poorly for GTRI’s 
ability to account for Russian-origin material—or any other provider. Even material that 
is accounted for remains a concern, as the process of securing nuclear materials may take 
considerable time.  
2. Domestic Support 
The administration has achieved domestic support for its nonproliferation goals, 
but maintaining domestic support has been challenging. In an effort to acquire the funds 
needed to support his nonproliferation efforts, President Obama has had to appeal to 
congressional leaders for funding and in some cases argue in favor of planned defunding. 
Some figures in congress have objected to cuts; Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) argued 
that cuts have impaired programs that have “made this country safer from nuclear 
terrorism.”93 Much of this stems from a 2013 Bipartisan Budget Act which limited the 
NNSA’s ability to draw additional funding—the end result would establish a necessity to 
shuffle funds among the NNSA’s three primary departments: nuclear weapons, naval 
reactors, and nonproliferation.94 Faced with a demand by Congress to decrease the 
NNSA budget, the DOE has opted to make the most significant cuts in nonproliferation 
programs, thereby impacting future nuclear security efforts directly.   
Decisions to defund some programs have regularly raised the ire of congressional 
leadership—particularly when their constituents are involved. The administration has 
proposed significant cuts to the Savannah River plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) recycling 
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plant in the FY2017 federal budget.95 Ongoing delays and the potential halting of 
funding would leave the future conversion efforts of 34 tons of plutonium in question—
efforts based on the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 
2010 protocols.96 A 2016 delay in converting plutonium into nuclear fuel at the Savannah 
River Site in South Carolina has resulted in a $100 million fine brought about by the 
state. Complicated by the arrival of 331 kg of plutonium from Japan, some within the 
U.S. nuclear enterprise feel efforts to secure materials from abroad is turning sites like 
Savannah River into an international “dumping ground.”97 In the absence of viable 
disposition plans the material may very well sit in storage until alternatives can be 
funded. Therefore, converting or diluting stockpiles of nuclear material is an important 
step and a necessary mechanism to deny weapons grade material to terrorists.  
3. International Support 
President Obama has skillfully promoted GTRI’s efforts to secure and recover 
nuclear materials within the international community. GTRI has extended its activities—
removal, protection, and conversion—into dozens of countries. GTRI practitioners have, 
to their credit, frequently overcome security concerns intrinsic to nuclear technology 
alongside other cultural and political hurdles to achieve their objectives. GTRI has 
assisted in the repatriation of Russian-origin nuclear material, often in tandem with 
efforts to convert HEU reactors to LEU.98 The program’s efforts have also greatly 
supported the Nuclear Security Summits’ calls for global action. President Obama’s vocal 
concern over nuclear terrorism—specifically the dangers of vulnerable nuclear 
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materials—found an established-face in the GTRI known to many actors in the 
international community. Having completely rid 11 countries of fissile material, and 
partially removed materials from 30 more, the President has resolved to continue his 
efforts abroad as long as he is in office.99 Overall, the President’s focus on material 
security has been a boon to GTRI and found support with a growing number of countries 
who seek to rid themselves of nuclear material, or at least capitalize on the opportunity 
for foreign support. However, growing friction abroad has already begun to undermine 
the program’s efforts. 
Russia’s increasing unwillingness to cooperate with the United States may be the 
single biggest hurdle to ongoing threat reduction efforts. Significant cuts in Russia’s 
nuclear security budget—two consecutive 10 percent cuts as of March 2016—threaten to 
undermine progress made by the GTRI and other threat reduction programs.100 Russia’s 
activities in Ukraine have greatly undermined the U.S.–Russian dialogue. Critics have 
highlighted the administration’s failure to detect and stop Russia’s activities in the 
Crimea, although it seems unlikely halting Russian aggression in the region would have 
done any more for U.S.-Russian relations than attempting to resolve the situation 
diplomatically.101 Until more substantial relations can be reestablished, however, some 
hope still remains for U.S.–Russian nuclear security efforts. Although Russia has halted 
U.S. nonproliferation activities within Russia, there are still opportunities within the 
region—Russia remains open to GTRI activities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Poland, and 
Uzbekistan.102 Overall, the administration has promoted and empowered GTRI efforts by 
establishing a broader nonproliferation message that has generally been reciprocated by 
the international community; however, as the President nears the end of his second term, 
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international friction may undermine future efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring 
nuclear materials. 
C. SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE  
In 1998, the DOE and Russian Federation State Customs Committee (RFSCC) 
launched the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program in an effort to detect illicit nuclear 
material trafficking.103 Originally focused on augmenting Russian detection capabilities, 
the program’s primary activity (SLD-Core) has expanded beyond its initial focus on the 
Russian boarder to include other countries.104 Planners were initially concerned with 
theft from Russia’s sizeable stockpiles of nuclear material. The events on 9/11, however, 
renewed fears of nuclear terrorism. In 2003, DOE expanded the SLD-Core activities by 
adding the Megaports Initiative—still managed under the broader SLD program—that 
provided equipment and training to personnel at select foreign seaports in support of the 
SLD’s “deter, detect, and interdict” mission.105 Gaining momentum from 2003, the SLD-
Core and Megaport programs grew the number of international monitoring sites over the 
next decade. Since 2008, the administration’s support for the SLD steadily declined as 
resources were refocused on material security under the Four-Year Effort. In FY2016 the 
SLD program was renamed as the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program 
(NSDD). The program was SLD for the majority of the Obama administration, and most 
of the associated literature refers to the program under the SLD moniker; consequently, 
this paper will continue to refer to the program as SLD for purposes of clarity.    
1. Implementation 
Concerns over the management and functionality of the SLD program, over time, 
resulted in a decreased willingness by the administration to support future efforts. SLD 
efforts remained largely on course for the first few years of the Obama administration’s 
initial term; however, preexisting concern over the utility of SLD combined with 
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sequestration pressures led a strategic review of the program in 2012. The review 
prompted the administration to propose a 65 percent cut in the overall SLD budget—with 
an 85 percent cut specifically targeting Megaports—in the FY13 budget proposal.106 
However, Congressional resistance to the administration’s proposed reductions would 
succeed, and the FY13 SLD budget would remain largely unchanged. The 2012 review 
was not, however, the first high-level inspection of the program. In 2006, a highly critical 
GAO report highlighted systematic failures within the program that greatly undermined 
its utility. Major concerns include the absence of a master list of U.S.-provided 
equipment; equipment that has been irregularly maintained and calibrated; pervasive 
corruption at some monitoring sites abroad; and unreported equipment failures.107 
Challenges implementing nuclear security measures domestically have only exacerbated 
the problem. The 2006 Safe Ports Act required 100 percent of all cargo entering the U.S. 
to be screened. As of 2016, the U.S. screens less than 5 percent of incoming cargo.108 
The shortfall has prompted the administration to seek aid from private sector entities. The 
all-cargo screening capability was intended to go into force in 2012, but has since been 
delayed twice and further delays are expected.109 However, the SLD program’s most 
frequent critiques are not based on what has been done, but how the program’s progress 
is being measured.  
Gauging the SLD program’s success remains difficult because current metrics are 
poor indicators to federal decision makers of the program’s benefits. Defined in the 
Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA) of 2010—an update of 
a 1993 document of the same name—federal agencies are required to integrate 
quantifiable goals into budgeting documents to illustrate cost-benefits to decision makers, 
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who then prioritize spending.110 This became problematic for the SLD program, since its 
inception the commonly used metric was the number of detection sites established.111 
While there have been documented success stories at sites, many of the specific countries 
of incident remain unidentified.112 Government reports indicated dozens of cases of 
nuclear material interdiction, one of which included the seizure of an unspecified volume 
of HEU.113  
Efforts to position appropriate equipment have been complicated by an unclear 
picture of nuclear material stockpiles. Cargo screening specialists have expressed concern 
over the former Soviet Union’s failure to “keep careful records of its inventory of special 
nuclear material at several dozen locations, so it is unknown whether material was 
already stolen from the stockpiles.”114 The frequent inability to demonstrate an empirical 
impact on nuclear smuggling has undermined the apparent value of the SLD program and 
the subsequent willingness of the administration to prioritize funding.115 It has not, 
however, undermined congressional support. Opinion with the legislature has frequently 
opposed the President’s desire to decrease SLD funding.  
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2. Domestic Support 
The administration has met with significant resistance from both Congress and 
SLD program managers in its efforts to reduce SLD funding. The House and Senate both 
opted to securing funding for SLD and Megaports efforts well above the President’s 
proposal—notable proponents included Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Senator Lamar 
Alexander (R-TN), Congressmen Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), and Congressmen Pete 
Visclosky (D-IN).116 Moreover, Congress denied the administration’s request to increase 
funding for domestic material-conversion efforts by $150 million—a program tied 
closely to the final disposition of secured nuclear material. Had these efforts originated 
from the House alone, it could have been argued that the Republican dominated body was 
engaged in partisan maneuvering; however, resistance came from both the House and 
Senate, and included direct opposition from some Democrats.117 Similar to GTRI, the 
administration’s pursuit of funding for MOX plutonium conversion called for targeted 
reductions in nonproliferation programs: a swap in funding priorities many in Congress 
saw as directly opposed to one another.118 In the end, the administration failed to sway 
congress in support of its stated priorities and would only see funding reductions in SLD 
efforts, which it had hoped to achieve in a year, occur more gradually.     
3. International Support 
Efforts to promote SLD activities through international diplomacy have greatly 
contributed to the program’s global presence, but cooling relations between the U.S. and 
Russia have had a detrimental impact on the program’s future potential. With Russia 
announcing in 2014 that it will discontinue cooperation with the U.S. on a number of 
nonproliferation programs, the status and future of SLD sites within Russia are 
“unknown”—about 45 percent of the SLD’s total monitoring stations are in Russian 
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territory.119 Destabilization of the region, specifically throughout the Ukraine and 
Crimea, has also resulted in the deactivation or destruction of 84 monitoring systems.120 
The impact to materials detection has undoubtedly reduced the SLD program’s 
effectiveness and its potential to detect would-be nuclear terrorists during transit. 
Russia’s large stockpiles of fissile material and that fact that a significant portion of the 
world’s documented smuggling attempts have occurred within that region,121 only stand 
to magnify the impact failing relations may have.  
In spite of Russia’s unwillingness to continue U.S.-led nonproliferation efforts, 
the SLD program has witnessed significant diplomatic successes. The administration’s 
efforts have gained inroads with other states in two important ways: the continued 
expansion of the SLD sites and the growing number of states willing to share some of the 
cost burden. In 2008, there were approximately 150 SLD sites installed and over a dozen 
maritime installations supported through the Megaports initiative; by 2015, the program 
had established over 600 static and mobile detection sites—490 sites have transitioned to 
partner country responsibility with “limited technical support.”122 Goals between FY15–
17 include the transitioning of an additional 62 sites to partner country responsibility.123 
Other states have opted to contribute financially, even in cases where the program has not 
established monitoring sites within their borders.124 Ultimately, the push to transition 
ownership of SLD sites to the country where they are located supports the program’s 
continued efforts monetarily—arguing for the program in Washington will undoubtedly 
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be easier if someone else is helping foot the bill. However, it does mean that equipment 
maintenance, calibration, and site operability will be entrusted to foreign actors who may 
not be as concerned about nuclear terrorism as the United States. 
D. GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM (GICNT)  
In 2006, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin began the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in an effort to promote the 
prevention of nuclear terrorism with partners in the global community.125 The initiative 
consists of scheduled meetings and exercises focused on the integration of member-
country’s capabilities to enhance global nuclear security efforts, the sharing of experience 
and expertise, and the promotion of opportunities that allow nations to share 
information.126 Further divided into nine specific principles, the GINCT is a completely 
voluntary activity. Every training and integration event occurs without establishing 
binding requirements. As of 2016, the initiative included 86 countries—of which 11 have 
joined since the Obama administration has been in office.127 
1. Implementation 
The GICNT provides a useful mechanism to promote and enhance nuclear 
security practices among international participants. A stated objective of the 
administration was to make the GICNT into a more “durable international institution.”128 
In a 2009 letter to the GICNT, President Obama outlined a series of improvements that 
would, if implemented, move the organization toward his goal. Objectives included the 
formalization of the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG), incentivizing 
cooperation by supporting partnered events, and redeveloping the Exercise Planning 
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Group (EPG).129 Of these goals the IAG was perhaps the most important as it created a 
governing body within the GICNT to coordinate the initiative’s efforts. The IAG formed 
a nexus where members could propose events (as hosts or participants) and, if necessary, 
coordinate for funding—most often coming from the two co-chairs.130 The GICNT has 
also adopted training priorities aimed at enhancing member nations’ crisis management 
capabilities following a nuclear attack—a unique focus given many programs and 
policies are solely concerned with the prevention of an attack.131 Adopted in the 2011 
Plenary Meeting, the GICNT established the Response and Mitigation Working Group 
(RMWG), which would host a series of events aimed at exploring best options in the 
aftermath of a nuclear event.132 The voluntary nature of the program likely attracts more 
participants by allowing members to share information at their own pace rather than 
attempt to mandate minimum levels of participation. The GICNT is, however, ultimately 
constrained by a lack of tasking authority. 
2. International Support 
In spite of supporting an increase in overall participants, the international 
community’s readiness to participate in GICNT activities appears to be waning. From 
2006–2008 an average of twelve events occurred annually, from 2009–2016 an average 
of roughly seven programs took place annually.133 In context of the administration’s 
greater nonproliferation efforts, however, this may not necessarily reflect an 
unwillingness to participate. The Nuclear Security Summits have provided a number of 
additional avenues where states can support nuclear security that were not available prior 
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to the Obama administration. Furthermore, many of the seminars and training events 
hosted by the GINCT provide opportunities for states to build relationships that continue 
outside of the hosted events—non-governmental agencies are regular attendees at these 
events and often maintain relationships with their counterparts abroad.134 It is, perhaps, 
because of the increased frequency of alternatives that countries feel they are doing 
enough, or are otherwise overburdened, by nuclear security measures. In spite of the 
administration’s call to make the GICNT a more durable institution, there does not appear 
to be a similar sentiment from the international community. Although current members 
continue to participate in annual meetings and exercises, there has been no consolidated 
push to formalize GICNT beyond its current mandate.135 Furthermore, participation in 
GICNT appears to be declining. It may be that with the increase in attention to nuclear 
security—the Nuclear Security Summits, GTRI and CTR programs—they must spread 
out their resources, or it may be the perception that enough has been done. Whatever the 
rationale, the GICNT remains a useful avenue for the administration to address nuclear 
terrorism but one that may be losing its appeal within the global community.  
As a co-chair of the organization, Russia’s continued influence on the GINCT is 
unclear in light of its withdrawal from many nonproliferation programs. As of the 10th 
anniversary meeting in 2016, Russia continued to send high level diplomats to participate 
and recommit to the GINCT principles.136 The joint U.S.–Russian origins of the GICNT 
may be the most important influence on Russia’s calculus. Russia’s halt on 
nonproliferation measures appears to be more frequently tied to bilateral Russian-U.S. 
programs rather than multilateral initiatives like the GINCT; moreover, the voluntary 
nature of GINCT facilitates an exit should Russia decide it has had enough. For now, it 
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would appear that Russia will maintain its position as co-chair until the next selection 
process in 2020.  
E. NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) 
PROGRAM 
One of the most well-established programs in the U.S. nonproliferation regime, 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has worked to improve nuclear 
security since its inception. Founded in an amendment by Senator Sam Nunn and Senator 
Richard Lugar, the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” the program was 
intended to be a temporary measure to secure stockpiles of nuclear material and weapons 
in the Soviet Union.137 It would, however, expand to become a decades-long initiative to 
promote nuclear security and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. Early CTR 
efforts were often plagued with contractual obligations to “buy American” that 
undermined domestic sustainability, or complaints from Russian partners that support and 
supplies were exceedingly slow to arrive.138 The following years would see both the 
building of relationships and policy adjustments that would expand the program’s global 
influence. The CTR program’s potential impact on nuclear terrorism was recognized 
early on. A Congressional hearing in 1996 identified Russia’s inability to secure its 
inherited nuclear-burden as a potential opportunity for would-be nuclear terrorists.139 
September 11, 2001, renewed the fear that Russian weapons or nuclear material could fall 
into the hands of terrorists, and the Bush administration increased funding to CTR 
activities “to support the war on terrorism.”140 The 2005 Bratislava summit reinforced 
the Bush administration’s push for strengthening Russian nuclear security by establishing 
reporting requirements and reoccurring security exercises—the reports would be 
delivered on a biannual schedule to the Russian and U.S. presidents. Since 1991, CTR 
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efforts are estimated to have deactivated over 7,600 nuclear warheads and 2,300 missiles, 
destroyed 33 ballistic missile submarines, enhanced security at nuclear storage sites 
throughout Russia,141 and denuclearized three former Soviet states—Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.142 The Bush administration would expand the CTR’s mandate, 
and in 2008 the program language would grow to include areas “outside of the former 
Soviet Union.”143 The expansion would, however, gain traction slowly—relatively small 
funding increments were allowed for projects outside the region and only with approval 
from Washington.144   
1. Implementation 
Once in office, the Obama administration would begin developing the CTR’s 
expanding mission and integrate the program into its broader nuclear security objectives. 
Although beginning before his administration, the President would encourage an 
expansion of the CTR’s activities beyond Russia’s borders. The planned growth would 
provide an opportunity for CTR efforts to include Asia and the Middle East in its ongoing 
activities; even including language for the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea.145 The nature of the change would eliminate the program’s original 
region-based approach—although activities in Russia would remain a priority by virtue 
of the sheer volume of material until Moscow refused to renew the program. The 
fundamental changes in the CTR program’s operational area would provide the 
administration an opportunity to promote its narrative of global nuclear security 
frequently exposed in the Nuclear Security summits. Arguing that “these programs are 
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designed to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists and states of concern,” the 
administration would release a strategy report to Congress outlining WMD prevention 
activities in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA).146 As of 2012, the 
administration’s efforts would establish procedures that allowed a greater share of current 
CTR funding to be spent within the MENA. Critics argued that the MENA was an area of 
growing concern and only two-percent of the roughly $1 billion in CTR activities being 
spent in the region was inadequate.147 As CTR activities expanded, however, the 
program faced increasing scrutiny from Washington regarding program objectives and 
budgetary practices.  
The administration promoted CTR efforts as a means of achieving broader 
nonproliferation goals, but congressional concern over programmatic inefficiencies drove 
increased legislative involvement. In 2010, Congress directed the Department of Defense 
to coordinate with the National Academy of Sciences “under which the Academy shall 
carry out an assessment to review the metrics developed and implemented under 
subsection (a) and identify possible additional or alternative metrics.”148 The report was 
critical of ongoing assessment practices, although, the report also identified possible 
shortfalls by participants outside of the DOD. Critiques included the following; failure to 
develop joint metrics; little cross-talk with Russia on realistic practices or objectives; a 
failure to prioritize objectives; a lack of consideration for “planned or unplanned change 
over time,” leaving some metrics less relevant due to circumstance.149 The report also 
highlighted a lack of information exchange between the other agencies—the DOE and 
DOS specifically.150 A second review in the FY2015 NDAA (S.2410) called for the 
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Secretary of Defense to strengthen measurement practices meant to enhance CTR 
effectiveness.151 In spite of these reviews, the administration steadily increased funding 
to the program—capping out at $530 million in 2014, an increase of almost $100 million 
since inheriting the program in 2009. Funding priorities have not, however, always been a 
measure of program support.  
2. Domestic Support 
Program funding would, at times, be in question due to unrelated disputes 
between the administration and Congress. The President vetoed the FY2016 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) over concerns that it failed to address poor spending 
habits—the use of wartime funds for day-to-day maintenance and possible continuation 
of sequestration. The NDAA also directly impeded his aims of closing down 
Guantanamo Bay—an unrealized goal since taking office.152 The President signed a 
revised version of the act a few months after; however, he would threaten a veto again in 
May of 2016 for the FY2017 NDAA for similar reasons.153 This unpredictability comes 
at an inopportune time for the CTR program. Already facing a declining budget, ensuring 
funding is available for commitment is an integral part of making any long-term program 
effective—both in fostering confidence among participants and establishing reliable 
multi-year resource allocation. Cited as problems during the program’s efforts in the 
former Soviet Union, erratic funding can greatly undermine programmatic efficiency.154   
Ultimately, however, congressional involvement in the CTR has been 
predominantly positive and has generally paralleled the President’s nonproliferation 
goals. In 2011, Congress directed the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense to 
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submit a plan to conduct CTR activities with the Peoples Republic of China.155 Other 
important initiatives have emerged from Congress to include the “Next Generation 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013—S.1021” and the “Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Modernization Act—H.R.2314.”156 In 2015 congress halted the use of any 
funds for CTR activities as a result of Russia’s activities in Ukraine and its violation of 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty; however, Congress provided 
allowances should the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State certify the 
activity.157 Overall, congressional activities supported of the administration’s aims and 
provided another mechanism to prevent nuclear terrorism.     
3. International Support 
The falling out with Russia as consequence of the Ukraine crisis has greatly 
impacted the administration’s CTR-related efforts. Funding in 2016 was the lowest in the 
administration’s history at $356 million, with further cuts proposed in FY2017. The full 
halt to U.S.-Russian CTR activities has arguably been the most powerful driver of this 
shift—the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) guiding CTR activities since 1992 
expired in 2013, and the two countries failed to negotiate conditions for its renewal. 
Representatives within the administration have suggested program completion as the 
main reason for funding reductions.158 However, Russia’s has stated that the CTR, as it 
stood, was “not consistent with our ideas about what forms and on what basis further 
cooperation should be built.”159 Meanwhile, the global denouncement of Russian 
activities in Ukraine complicated the President’s ability to reach an agreement—although 
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U.S.–Russian concerns over transparency and disagreements over arms reduction 
predated the Ukraine crisis.160 The result was the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental 
Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) agreement. The program focuses on 
nuclear security but excludes cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD). 
While this affords inroads for continued cooperation with the Russian nuclear energy 
community and a more general approach to nuclear security, the agreement essentially 
halts activities related to weapons reduction—historically a cornerstone of the CTR 
program.161 As it relates to nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism, the 
MNEPR still facilitates meaningful cooperation. Although the MOD has been excluded 
from future CTR activities, the MNEPR offers an opportunity to combat the threat of 
nuclear terrorism. The MNEPR agreement has not halted continued efforts to secure 
materials and repatriate HEU or plutonium to its country of origin—be it U.S. or 
Russia.162 The new program has also provided a means to allow European states to fund 
clean-up projects throughout Russia; convert HEU stocks to LEU; enhance customs 
control targeting nuclear materials; improve security at nuclear storage sites; and 
continue nuclear submarine dismantlement.163  
Critics have highlighted the impact on transparency and how much of Russia’s 
nuclear security is now out of sight to the global community. Combined with Russia’s 
struggling economy, critics warn that nuclear weapon and material security in the country 
will suffer.164 The ending of the CTR program coupled with ongoing sanctions in Russia 
are unlikely to facilitate a short-term solution to this black-out for the administration. 
Supporters of the program have highlighted the agreement as a means to transition away 
from the “donor-recipient” relationship that traditionally characterized the CTR and 
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develop a more balanced partnership.165 While lacking the scope of its predecessor, the 
MNEPR offers the current and future administrations a mechanism to enhance nuclear 
security procedures and reduce the overall threat of nuclear terrorism.      
F. NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMITS (NSS) 
Shortly after his speech in Prague, President Obama announced the need for a 
Global Summit concerning Nuclear Security. The first summit, hosted in Washington, 
DC, with leaders from 47 countries, assisted the administration’s nuclear security goals in 
two important ways. First, it provided a forum to coordinate directly with the highest 
levels of foreign leadership—many countries were represented by their respective head of 
state. Second, the summit emphasized “concrete national and international actions.” The 
summits used unique language to capture these activities—House Gifts were national 
commitments or accomplishments while Gift Baskets were joint statements of 
commitment. The desired objectives were outlined in the 2010 Washington Work Plan, a 
detailed seven-page document identifying methods to improve nuclear security.166 The 
plan provided a framework for President Obama to communicate and prioritize nuclear 
security objectives for the summit participants and would remain an important document 
for the following three summits. The proceeding summits would take place in 2012 
(Seoul, South Korea), a third in 2014 (Hague, Netherlands), and the final summit in 2016 
(Washington, DC). Like the first summit, each gathering would provide an opportunity 
for countries to make statements highlighting steps toward enhancing nuclear security.   
1. Implementation  
The implementation of the nuclear security summits characterized the 
administration’s direct approach to nuclear security issues. Although objectives identified 
during the series were generally non-binding, the Washington Work Plan eschewed 
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vague language and provided a list of specific recommendations to enhance global 
nuclear security. Special emphasis was placed on the enforcement of activities identified 
in UNSCR 1540 and improving the level of cooperation with the IAEA.167 The Work 
Plan’s recommendation had a clear impact on future summits as states submitted their 
National Progress Reports. Verbiage in each country’s reports frequently reflected the 
Work Plan’s initial recommendations, identifying steps taken to forward domestic and, at 
times, global nuclear security.168 Collectively, the summits offered a number of 
mechanisms for countries to officially note their completed or intended goals. Since the 
end of the final summit in 2016, roughly 95 percent of the commitments made have been 
honored.169 
Critics have, however, pointed out a procedural shortfall of the summits. The 
Nuclear Security Summits’ exclusivity reduced their ability to influence a global 
audience. Participants of the summits were invited by the U.S. based on their stockpiles 
of nuclear materials—generally by volume—and whether they might be open to dialogue 
“without protracted negotiations and compromises.”170 Screening summit participants 
runs counter to the administration’s global nuclear security narrative. Hand picking 
countries that are more likely to cooperate has short-term benefits—particularly useful 
due to each summits’ short duration. In the long run, however, many of the measures 
addressed at the summits require participation from the global community. Therefore, 
countries excluded from the events—who subsequently have no say in what is decided 
upon—may be less willing to cooperate.171 Russia’s absence from the final summit, 
however, eclipsed the summit’s deliberate exclusion of other, smaller countries. The 
sentiment among Russian decision makers was the summits were a U.S.-led mechanism 
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to pressure Russia into unfavorable strategic-nuclear concessions—specifically by 
leveraging the threat of nuclear terrorism.172  
2. Domestic Support 
Domestic support for the program has been mixed. Former Senator Sam Nunn 
lauded the 2010 summit as a “watershed moment for nuclear security,” citing the 
significant international support as evidence of the program’s potential.173 Critics have 
argued that participation in the summits is voluntary—as is any agreement reached during 
the summit—and are therefore not tangible steps forward. Former Republican Senator 
Jon Kyl argued the “the summit’s purported accomplishment is a non-binding 
Communique that largely restates current policy and makes no meaningful progress in 
dealing with nuclear terrorism threat.”174 Difficulties securing domestic support for 
nuclear security matters also complicated the President’s efforts to lead by example. Only 
after declaring the U.S. support for the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials (CPPNM) at three different summits did the President secure a ratification.175 
The broader range of programs mobilized to support the Presidents efforts would, 
however, provide a more robust means of establishing credibility within the international 
community and would help facilitate broader objectives of the Washington Working 
Papers. 
3. International Support 
For the duration of the summits, the administration has greatly enhanced the 
frequency and impact of international dialogue on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism. 
From the beginning the summits were geared toward high-level decision makers—
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frequently the heads of states or prime ministers themselves. In order to credibly, and 
repeatedly, attain this level of involvement the President knew that he too must become 
an important part of the summit process.176 A great deal of diplomatic preparation 
established priorities and speaking points before each summit—often conducted by 
“sherpas” designated to speak on behalf of a country.177 The resulting dialogue also 
promoted the President’s material security goals—many of the 11 countries made 
nuclear-material-free during the Four-Year Effort first declared their willingness to 
participate at the summits. What was missing from the summits, however, was a 
willingness to discuss complex and challenging issues. Deliberately structured for short 
and direct dialogue, the summits were not necessarily set up to tackle issues that may 
require protracted negotiations and this lack of depth may have undermined their full 
potential. But they arguably achieved one of their primary goals—raising global 
awareness on nuclear security.  
The emphasis on streamlined diplomacy and rapid negotiations may have resulted 
in missed opportunities at the NSS series. Documents from the summits openly indicate 
the series purposefully avoided “sensitive issues” that may have impeded the event’s 
progress—in this case nuclear weapon materials.178 Kenneth N. Luongo critiqued this 
approach, suggesting a need to more deeply address the framework of international rules 
that govern nuclear security and that because the summits failed to do so “gaps and weak 
links in the nuclear security system have been allowed to persist.”179 The failure to 
address these topics may in fact have been a missed opportunity, but discussion of 
weapons and weapon material was not necessarily the objective of the summits. 
Furthermore there were official side-conferences that occurred simultaneously to the NSS 
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series addressing broader issues not directly addressed at the conference. Solutions for a 
Secure Nuclear Future (SSNF) included over 200 nuclear security experts and the 
Nuclear Industry Summit involved hundreds of company presidents and industry leaders 
addressing how NSS decisions might be implemented.180 The summits may have failed 
to grapple with the idea of a more holistic global nuclear security architecture; however, 
they raised the issue of nuclear security to the head-of-state level and prompted countries 
to formally commit resources or endorse efforts, like the CPPNM. As the summits came 
to a close, the President emphasized the need to maintain dialogue on nuclear security 
and how organizations like Interpol, the UN, and IAEA can continue efforts begun at the 
summits.181 Whether a similar emphasis on nuclear security will continue in the absence 
of direct U.S. involvement is unclear.    
G. CONCLUSION 
The Obama administration has committed itself to reducing the threat of nuclear 
terrorism, but it has encountered significant difficulties in its pursuit of this goal. 
Programs like the GTRI and CTR have enhanced global nuclear material security and 
have promoted the use of peaceful nuclear energy. Large quantities of weapons grade 
material have been consolidated or secured reducing the number of vulnerable locations 
in dozens of countries. The President has gained support from the international 
community as well. The Nuclear Security Summits and GICNT provided valuable 
opportunities to revive support for nuclear security and for the duration of the Obama 
administration has made the U.S. the global leader in nuclear security. SLD efforts have 
also expanded well beyond their initial scope by establishing a mechanism for material 
smuggling detection that continues to grow. 
Alongside the administration’s successes, however, there exist important 
problems. The President has consistently struggled to reach an accord with Congress, and 
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an inability to convince legislators has stunted some of his funding-related goals. 
Congressional disagreements with the President have also put material downblending 
options in jeopardy—a capability necessary to meet international agreements and to 
finally convert of a growing plutonium stockpile into peaceful nuclear-fuel. Friction with 
Russia has also put the President’s aspirations at risk. Rapidly cooling relations with 
Moscow has greatly reduced the willingness of Russia to participate in U.S.-sponsored 
nonproliferation programs.  
Reaching a consensus with the international community will play an important 
role in the following chapter. Chapter III will focus on how the Obama administration has 
managed select internationally-led nonproliferation efforts, and whether there been an 
impact on the threat of nuclear terrorism. The implementation and strength of support 
from the domestic audience will remain important considerations. However, the 
international nature of the efforts detailed in Chapter III requires special attention to how 





III. INTERNATIONALLY LED NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS
UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
This Chapter III examines how the Obama administration participated in 
international nonproliferation efforts. In observing select programs and policies, the 
chapter gives specific consideration given to the following themes: the effectiveness of 
programs and policy implementation; the administration’s capacity for rallying domestic 
support for the nonproliferation measures; and the level to which the administration 
achieved consensus with the international community.  
President Obama’s approach to international nonproliferation programs was, in 
many regards, similar to his broad methodology when dealing with domestic efforts. The 
administration argued arms control, material security, and disarmament efforts all 
provided a means to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. This approach facilitated the 
President’s range of nuclear objectives—disarmament and nuclear security being at the 
forefront. Nuclear terrorism was just as often the focus of an effort as it was a loosely 
related benefactor. 
The President frequently cited the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as 
capturing both the ultimate goal of disarmament and as the guarantor of peaceful nuclear 
energy.182 Although not directly addressing nuclear terrorism, the President promoted the 
NPT like he did other closely-related programs—less weapons meant fewer opportunities 
for theft by terrorists. Another program, United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1887 (UNSCR 1887), was directly championed by President Obama in an effort to 
reinvigorate the NPT. Like the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was 
approached as a means of indirectly influencing weapons development and production. 
The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was, like the CTBT, a means of influencing 
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the availability of nuclear weapons and material and by extension access to the same by 
nuclear terrorists.  
Other international efforts were more directly geared toward the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) 
nested comfortably within the President’s own material security efforts and was 
considered to be an important facet of the global community’s nonproliferation legal-
framework. Similarly, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) established codified legal requirements aimed at combating 
nuclear terror that states party to the convention must adhere too. United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR) performed a similar role—requiring states to enhance 
their domestic nuclear security measures. Ultimately, President Obama used each effort 
as a means to mitigate the threat of nuclear terror.  
A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
The NPT is the centerpiece of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Since 
its inception, the treaty has played a critical role in establishing normative nuclear-policy. 
Taking shape in 1968, the treaty was established to support three pillars of 
nonproliferation: States with nuclear weapons are prohibited from sharing the weapons or 
technology with non-nuclear states; all parties are entitled to pursue peaceful nuclear 
energy programs; and all parties should take meaningful steps toward disarmament.183 At 
its inception, the NPT was primarily concerned with preventing proliferation between 
states; however, the growing sentiment that nuclear-terrorism is a preeminent threat has 
refocused the NPT’s role in the global nonproliferation regime.  
1. Implementation
In an effort to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, the NPT has been an 
important part of the Obama administration’s overall narrative. The 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) argued that U.S. pursuit of NPT goals would “reinvigorate the 
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nonproliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”184 To this end, the 
President called for tighter controls over the spread of weapons and technology; 
specifically, he called for enhanced international inspections, consequences for NPT rule 
breakers and a new approach to the spread of global nuclear power.185  
The Obama administration has struggled to promote safeguards against would-be 
nuclear terrorists while simultaneously supporting the spread of peaceful nuclear energy. 
Speaking in Prague, the President reaffirmed the three pillars as a “basic bargain” of the 
treaty.186 The NPT has provided the President a widely accepted means to promote this 
goal; however, critics have argued that the administration’s approach to the NPT has been 
insufficient. Unlike his calls to strengthen the PSI and GICNT, the President chose not to 
encourage any enhancement of the NPT as it currently stands—the NPT lacks both a 
governing council and dedicated secretariat that might assist with both implementation 
and administration.187 Nonproliferation experts have pointed out that the language of the 
NPT still provides ample room for countries to produce weapons-grade material under 
the guise of a peaceful energy program.188 The administration frequently emphasized its 
efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism were not intended to curb the right of 
peaceful nuclear power.189  
The administration has allocated significant resources in support of NPT and the 
use of peaceful nuclear energy while simultaneously seeking to secure materials from 
potential terrorists. Programs like the GTRI and CTR have often been the action agents to 
address proliferation concerns. These efforts have afforded President Obama 
opportunities to support his broader global nonproliferation objectives while addressing 
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concerns over terrorists stealing weapons or materials. An increasing number of states are 
exercising their right to peaceful nuclear power—a 2014 IAEA report identified 438 
reactors currently operating and an additional 70 under construction.190 Consequently, 
U.S. efforts to protect states’ rights to nuclear power and maintain global security has 
often centered around an emphasis on conversion from HEU to LEU reactors. 
Spearheaded by GTRI and CTR agents, the administration has sought to reduce the 
global “availability” of fissile material by reducing its associated demand.  
The technical capability intrinsic to nuclear energy production is closely related 
too, often a requirement of, the production of nuclear weapons. Conducted every five 
years, nations’ party to the NPT conduct a review conference aimed at promoting the 
treaty’s three pillars and addressing emerging concerns. Some considered the President’s 
first review conference in 2010 a great success—perhaps more as a product of 
comparative evaluation since the 2005 conference was characterized as “the worst failure 
ever since these gatherings started.”191 The President’s early entrance into the realm of 
nuclear matters brought with it a degree of optimism that helped to buoy the 2010 
conference—twenty of the participating nations cited President Obama’s activities 
positively on 66 distinct occasions.192 His speech in Prague and the first Nuclear Security 
Summit both publically reinforced the administration’s broader agenda. The conclusion 
of the President’s efforts, however, was considered acceptable but not substantive.193    
2. Domestic Support 
The administration’s call for a strengthened and reinvigorated NPT was generally 
met with mixed feelings from Congress. The senate voiced its support of the NPT by 
passing Resolution 466 “Commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Treaty” and urging 
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the President to promote universality of the treaty.194 As a resolution, S.Res.466 offered a 
means of showing solidarity with the spirit of the NPT but was drafted without any 
functional measures. The President did submit some actionable measures, the Treaty of 
Pelindaba and the Treaty of Raotonga—protocols calling for an Africa Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zone (NWFZ) and a South Pacific NWFZ respectively—were sent to the Senate by 
President Obama following the 2010 NPT Review Conference.195 Each would, in 
practice, provide a regional reinforcement of the NPT. The treaty language emphasizes a 
more expansive list of “should nots” that include proliferation activities that would 
potentially put weapons or materials in the hands of non-state actors.196 However, as of 
2016, both treaties remain unratified by the U.S. Senate.197  
3. International Support 
Efforts to stop would-be weapon programs have been assisted by the NPT. The 
JCPOA was an attempt to stop just such activity. Prior to the JCPOA, the President 
argued that “the greatest threat to proliferation in the Middle East and to the NPT is Iran’s 
failure to live up to its NPT obligations.”198 Early in the administration’s tenure, the 
President’s message attracted the international community, facilitating efforts to 
reinvigorate the NPT. The Nuclear Security Summits, signing of the New START, and 
the Prague speech provided President Obama a great deal of credibility going into the 
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2010 NPT Review Conference.199 Eventually, the agreed upon results included: nuclear 
weapon states would not be obligated to disarm within a fixed timeline and non-weapon 
states would not face any new obligations; a minor but arguably forward moving 
consensus—especially given the 2005 conference had been stymied in its initial stages 
and was unable to pass an agenda.200 
There would, however, be resistance. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran 
argued that President Obama’s focus on nuclear terrorism was, in reality, a diversion for 
the purpose of concealing U.S. nuclear weapon activities.201 Russia was also resistant, 
refusing to concede to any restrictions on nuclear weapons use—it was mistakenly 
assumed that the recently signed New START would have fostered a more cooperative 
tone between the U.S. and Russia during the conference.202 In spite of resistance, the 
generally positive momentum of the conference facilitated a revisiting of the Middle 
Eastern WMD-FZ—the first since 1995.203 The WMD-FZ would reinforce the NPT’s 
broader call for a weapon-free world with more actionable regulatory measures. Attempts 
to settle the issue at the 2010 conference fell short, but plans were made to hold a 
regional conference in 2012 in an effort to capitalize on progress made. Ultimately, the 
2012 conference would not occur, and the following 2015 NPT Review Conference 
would not enjoy the same progress as 2010.  
The administration’s ability to reach consensus at the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference declined considerably compared to the 2010 conference. Relations between 
the U.S. and Russia had further deteriorated to an extent that cooperation was unrealistic. 
In addition, the failure to realize a Middle East WMD-FZ was the product of U.S. and its 
allies rejecting the plan as written—the U.S. resisted based on shared interests with 
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Israel.204 Throughout the second review conference, nuclear terrorism remained a 
frequently cited threat, but the conference’s stagnation prevented any further exploration 
of the idea and its relationship to the NPT.205    
The administration has also faced criticism for proposing a costly nuclear weapon 
modernization program. Critics have argued that the modernization program poses a 
threat to the NPT and is a missed opportunity to work toward meeting the NPT call to 
disarm.206 Furthermore, it contradicts the President’s message that the continued 
presence of nuclear weapons carries with it the threat of theft by terrorists, and states 
must therefore seek disarmament at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile, proponents like 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel argued that a combination of cultural shortfalls within 
the U.S. nuclear force and aging nuclear technical capabilities required a well-funded 
refurbishment.207 The difficulties of balancing calls for continued reliance on nuclear 
weapon systems while promoting his warnings of nuclear terrorism have challenged the 
President’s aspirations for disarmament. 
B. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) 
The CTBT began at the Conference on Disarmament and was adopted by the UN 
in 1996 as a measure to eliminate explosive nuclear testing around the world.208 The 
treaty focuses on halting weapon’s “horizontal and vertical proliferation by permanently 
freezing the state of global nuclear weapon development” by denying countries the ability 
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to conduct nuclear testing.209 Forty-four states are identified in Annex-2 of the treaty 
whose ratification is required for the document to enter into force. As of July 19, 2016, 
the United States,210 China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran, and Egypt have all 
failed to ratify the treaty.211 U.S. efforts to ratify the treaty began with the Clinton 
administration. Shortly after the treaty was drafted, President Bill Clinton signed the 
document and submitted it to the Senate for ratification approval. The Senate, however, 
rejected the treaty in 1999—failing to acquire the two-third vote by a significant 
margin.212 The Bush administration halted efforts to reconsider the treaty. 
Although failing to have entered into force as of yet, a verification regime (Article 
IV) exists. The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of 321 scientific 
monitoring stations and 16 laboratories spread throughout the globe funded by dues paid 
by member states—detection methods include a suite of hydro-acoustic, infrasound, 
radionuclide, and seismic systems.213 Although limited by the status of the treaty, and the 
willingness of non-signatories to participate, the CTBT verification regime remains a 
useful tool to the global community—it has detected all of the DPRK’s nuclear tests.214  
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1. Implementation 
During his 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama declared his intent to see the 
CTBT ratified.215 Like other arms control programs, the CTBT offered the President a 
useful and widely supported treaty with which he could promote its his nuclear security 
goals. Concerns over the theft of nuclear weapons or materials by terrorists have often 
been at the nexus of the administration’s arms control vision and efforts to combat 
nuclear terrorism.216 In this case, the CTBT’s influence on nuclear terrorism lay in its 
potential to influence the production of weapons and materials—the logic being a more 
universal test ban would be a disincentive for the production of both.  
Quick to reengage the CTBT efforts and to synchronize its overall 
nonproliferation message, the administration participated in the Conference on 
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September of 2009.217 However, the 
treaty remains unratified by the United States, a fact that has undermined the 
administration’s ability to persuade similar countries like China, India, and Pakistan.218 
In spite of repeated calls for ratification—most recently during his visit to Hiroshima—
the President has, as of the final months of his presidency, not achieved his goal of the 
treat’s entry into force.219     
2. Domestic Support 
Domestic politics have played the most important role in preventing the United 
States from ratifying the CTBT. When President Obama took office, he had the benefit of 
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having just left the Senate—as had his vice president—and all the procedural familiarity 
that accompanies it; moreover, both the Senate and House held a Democratic majority.220 
In spite of these advantages, the administration relied heavily on executive agreements to 
coordinate international exchanges. Increasing resistance from Congress lead Secretary of 
State John Kerry to suggest that Senate approval for treaties had become “physically 
impossible.”221 Executive agreements offered the President an opportunity to circumvent 
Senate resistance and pursue his own objectives; particularly as congressional influence 
shifted in favor of the republicans. It is important to note that the presidential swing 
toward non-treaty agreements has been a growing phenomenon since WWII and is not 
exclusive to the Obama administration.222 Opponents in Congress argued that the 
inability to verify CTBT violations and the potential impact on U.S. nuclear readiness 
made the treaty unappealing to U.S. interests.223 However, as Republican representation 
in congress grew until attaining a majority in 2010 experts suggested some resistance 
based primarily on partisan-lines.224  
Ultimately, however, the President’s unwillingness to submit the treaty for 
approval to the Senate stymied any real effort to see the CTBT realized. Early in his 
administration the President suggested resubmittal at a “practical date.”225  Nearing the 
end of his second term, however, there does not appear to be a renewed push to see the 
treaty through.  
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3. International Support 
The international community frequently pressured the United States to ratify the 
CTBT citing the potential impact. International proponents of the treaty argued that if the 
United States ratified the CTBT, it might influence other hold-out countries to do the 
same.226 China has suggested it will follow if the United States ratifies, and Ambassador 
Nobuyasu Abe, the former Under Secretary General of the United Nations for 
Disarmament Affairs, has argued that the pressures on the remaining hold-out countries 
will eventually lead them to capitulate.227 Technical reservations about the IMS’s 
capabilities also exist among the international community. However, the CTBTO is vocal 
about IMS capabilities. A 2002 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
concluded that nuclear explosions with a yield as low as 0.1 kilotons could be 
detected.228 Furthermore, the report argued the only plausible methods to circumvent the 
IMS are cavity decoupling and mine masking—methods attempted unsuccessfully by 
both the U.S. and Soviet Union during their nuclear tests—and that are still unable to 
reduce detectable yield below the IMS capabilities.229  
Stalled U.S. progress on the CTBT has left the international community reluctant 
to invest more time convincing the Obama administration to promote the treaty at home. 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov acknowledged it would be unrealistic 
to expect CTBT ratification this late in the Obama administration; however, Rybakov 
argues that the United States’ “stagnant position” is the primary obstacle preventing the 
CTBT from entering into force.230 Japan and Kazakhstan made more measured 
statements by calling for the remaining Annex-2 countries to ratify without delay—they 
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did not refer to the U.S. directly.231 As President Obama completes his term’s remaining 
months, it appears unlikely the “practical date” he cited will arrive. Consequently, the 
CTBT will remain shelved from U.S. consideration until at least 2017–18 when the new 
President is sworn in and Senate elections may create a more receptive audience. 
C. CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR 
MATERIALS (CPPNM)  
The CPPNM offered a legally binding mechanism to enhance nuclear material 
security. Adopted in 1979, the convention’s language specifically addressed the security 
of nuclear material intended for peaceful purposes while in transit between countries, 
although, absent from the convention is language specifically regarding weapon-material 
security.232 Concerned that the convention was too narrowly scoped, a diplomatic 
conference in 2005 drafted an amendment expanding the CPPNM’s initial mandate to 
include the security of nuclear facilities, nuclear storage, and transport. The amendment 
also enhanced the capacity of countries to coordinate recovery efforts of lost nuclear 
material and to mitigate the impact of nuclear sabotage or damage due to conflict.233 In 
2007, President George Bush submitted the CPPNM to the Senate for approval. The 
Senate approved the convention, but legislation adjusting the U.S. criminal code did not 
follow.234 President Obama approached the CPPNM as an important component of the 
global nonproliferation regime targeting nuclear terrorism. However, capitalizing on this 
opportunity required support from domestic leadership and a willingness to adapt U.S. 
law to fit the CPPNM’s requirements.   
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1. Implementation 
Support for the CPPNM paralleled the administration’s broader material security 
efforts by providing a legal backdrop for its ongoing practical measures, e.g., GTRI and 
SLD. President Obama first submitted CPPNM legislation in 2010, but did not receive 
approval due to conflicts within the Senate over specific language for the proposed 
changes—although there was overwhelming support for the effort from the House.235 
Following the 2010, the White House hoped to capture congressional support by framing 
the convention as updates to “the U.S. Criminal Code to strengthen our ability to fully 
investigate and prosecute acts of nuclear terrorism.”236 However, a failure to achieve 
consensus within the Senate stalled the CPPNM once again.  
The President resubmitted the proposed legislative changes again in 2015.237 On 
this occasion, however, the implementing legislation was attached to the USA Freedom 
Act—a bill primarily concerned with establishing limitations on intelligence-collection 
practices targeting U.S. citizens.238 The public unrest over government practices was, 
perhaps, advantageous to the administration. Attaching the CPPNM and ICSANT 
language to a document restricting domestic collection undoubtedly capitalized on the 
act’s popularity.  
The President’s official press statement about the USA Freedom Act lacked any 
mention of the CPPNM, ICSANT, or the threat of nuclear terrorism. Inserting the 
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changes needed for CPPNM ratification was, perhaps, more opportunistic than planned. 
The President did, however, highlight that the Freedom Act’s delay was all on the 
shoulders of congressional leadership—evidence of the administration’s struggle to reach 
an accord with the legislature.239 The June 1, 2015 ratification of the CPPNM was a 
victory for President Obama’s material security goals, however, the long delay has 
reduced the chance of implementation during his presidency. 
2. International Support 
The President’s early efforts to ratify the CPPNM had a mixed impact within the 
international community. On one hand, the inability to ratify the CPPNM undermined the 
President’s declarations in Prague that the U.S. should lead. Nickolas Roth, a research 
associate at the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, highlighted the United States’ ability to 
promote international action by setting the example and how, in spite of declaring 
ratification to be a priority at three of the four NSS, the U.S. failed to do so.240 
Conversely, Roth credits the administration with convincing 61 countries that have 
acceded to the 2005 amendment since entering into office in 2009—prior to the Obama 
administration only 23 countries had acceded.241   
Early in the administration, the initial NSS work plan declared both the CPPNM 
and ICSANT in need of “resuscitation.”242 It would appear, therefore, that in spite of a 
protracted fight to see success domestically, the administration’s other nuclear security 
efforts have paid dividends. More than half of the states that signed during the Obama 
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administration did so during one of the four NSS.243 As of May 8, 2016, enough 
countries have ratified the 2005 amendment for it to enter into force.244 The relative 
newness of the CPPNM within the U.S. legal framework has left little precedent for its 
impact on nuclear terrorism and, more broadly, nuclear security. The administration’s 
ratification has, however, overcome a long-standing shortfall and begun the integration of 
an internationally accepted nuclear security measure.  
D. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS 
OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (ICSANT) 
The ICSANT offered the administration opportunity to specifically target nuclear 
terror. The convention requires that states develop legislation to penalize activities linked 
to nuclear terrorism and to establish regions of jurisdiction in order to clarify enforcement 
obligations. The ICSANT was developed by a UN ad-hoc committee, and, based on a 
draft document presented by Russia (A/AC.252/L.3), was eventually adopted as a formal 
Convention by the General Assembly on April 13, 2005.245  
The convention was unique in that it laid out a number of specific requirements 
mandating countries to adopt legal principles criminalizing acts identified in the treaty, to 
actively attempt to combat nuclear terrorism within their borders, and to prosecute 
violators of these laws or extradite the offender to countries that will (the article 
specifically requires the offenses not be considered political in nature in order to avoid a 
“political offenses exception”).246 Like the CPPNM, an attempt to seek ratification 
approval of the ICSANT during the Bush administration was approved by Congress but 
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ultimately held back due to disagreements over how the U.S. legal code should be 
adjusted to meet the convention’s intent.247   
1. Implementation 
Achieving Senate approval to ratify the ICSANT was a struggle, taking almost the 
entirety of both presidential terms, but it remained a victory for the administration’s 
nonproliferation strategy. Like the CPPNM, the required legislative changes were 
bundled into the USA Freedom Act. Upon passage of the USA Freedom Act in June 
2015, the administration met the ICSANT legislative requirements and received Senate 
approval for ratification. Ratified in September of 2015 the treaty, like the CPPNM, came 
late enough that implementation has begun near the end of the Obama administration and 
its impact has yet to be fully realized.248   
2. International Support 
Although achieving ICSANT ratification of the near the end of his administration, 
the President missed an opportunity to use U.S. participation as method of influence. 
Early in the administration, the ICSANT was highlighted as a crucial piece of the 
international legal framework combating nuclear terrorism—pursuit of ratification was 
considered a major step forward when presented as a “gift basket” during the NSS 
series.249 The U.S., however, failed to match this progress. This undermined the United 
States’ credibility and ability to argue for tighter security in powers like Russia and 
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China250 or to influence non-participatory nations like Pakistan, Israel, and North 
Korea.251 However, the struggle to ratify the ICSANT was not unique to Washington.  
The difficulties in achieving state-level consensus, and ultimately approval, on the 
ICSANT were wide spread. Countries like Canada and Australia—that have a long 
history of shared security goals with the U.S.—ratified only after years of consideration, 
and Ireland has yet to sign.252 Jeffery Knopf suggests that the challenge may lie not in 
any reluctance to criminalize nuclear terrorism, but because the convention is “more of a 
counterterrorism measure than a nonproliferation measure, and therefore it became 
entangled in the larger problem that the UN has not been able to reach an agreed upon 
definition of terrorism.”253 The administration’s attempt to overcome this discrepancy 
took the majority of its eight years. Ratification of the ICSANT is a useful step forward 
in enhancing the legal framework targeting nuclear terrorism. However, the president’s 
long delay has greatly undermined efforts to implement and exploit the convention during 
his remaining months.  
E. FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY (FMCT) 
In September 1993, former President Bill Clinton called on the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) to work toward an international ban on fissile material 
production—arguing that increasing global stockpiles “were raising the danger of nuclear 
terrorism in all nations.”254 In December of that same year the UNGA passed resolution 
48/75L that sought to examine the feasibility of a global fissile material production halt, 
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the Conference on Disarmament (CD) further scrutinized the resolution in order to 
determined how such a treaty might be implemented.255 The Canadian ambassador 
General E. Shannon was charged with this task, and in 1995 Shannon established the 
framework for a committee whose role was to negotiate the treaty among UN 
members.256 Efforts to see the treaty to fruition since 1995 have, however, been 
problematic. Resistance to the proposed treaty language most frequently originates from 
nuclear weapon states. Concerns over the applicability to existing stockpiles and treaty 
verification are the most frequently cited objections—a 2006 U.S. white paper to Geneva 
argues that adequate verification is unrealistic and therefore verification provisions 
should be removed from the proposed treaty entirely.257 Following his speech in Prague, 
President Obama approved a renewed effort to see the FMCT treaty realized, arguing, “If 
we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to 
the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that created them.” Since his 
declaration to end fissile material production, the President has met only minor success.  
1. Implementation  
An inability to begin negotiations has stalled the FMCT and prevented major 
progress. Since 1993, the FMCT has failed to coalesce into anything beyond a proposal to 
negotiate. The failure to overcome the issues of verification and existing stockpiles has 
halted forward progress. The President’s attempt to reinvigorate FMCT talks prompted 
the CD to do the same—resulting in a new working group in 2009.258 In spite of 
differences over what provisions should remain within the treaty, its fundamental aim has 
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the potential to reinforce President Obama’s vision. By capping the production of fissile 
material it would essentially establish an upper limit on the amount of material that 
needed defending from terrorists. However, the working group failed to gain any traction 
among the international community and key disagreements over the proposed terms has 
kept the treaty in a deadlock.  
2. International Support 
The Obama administration has actively attempted to overcome longstanding 
hurdles that have prevented the FMCT from moving forward. There have been cases 
where countries opt to tie FMCT to efforts in loosely related areas—China argued FMCT 
negotiations could not move forward unless they were tied into implications of U.S. 
missile defense initiatives and space activities,259 and other states have argued similarly 
about related disarmament negotiations.260 Pakistan’s resistance to the treaty has been 
especially resolute. Since the mid-1990s, Pakistani representatives to the CD have argued 
against discussion on the treaty or redirected the debate toward less relevant 
administrative criteria. Pakistan argued that its lack of parity with India’s fissile material 
stockpiles was unacceptable and that they could not “agree to freeze inequality.”261  
The net result has been a stagnation of FMCT efforts since its proposal—the 
stutter of meetings and conference held since its inception have done little to forward the 
treaty’s development. While briefing the CD, the State Department’s Rose Gottenmoeller 
argued that holding FMCT discussions among a smaller group—in this case the P5 
(United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom—might alleviate the back-and-
forth delays that have impeded action.262 Failing to reach a consensus among all the 
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NWS, meaningful dialogue among the P5 would still be a significant step forward, she 
argued.  
Like many of the previously mentioned programs, consensus and action among 
the world’s preeminent powers can have a catalytic effect within the broader international 
community. In the case of the administration’s proposed P5 FMCT talks, however, 
failing to incorporate non-NPT nuclear powers failed to address the primary issue. In 
practice, NPT participants are only authorized to produce peaceful nuclear material, and 
the P5 NWS that are NPT participants have already ceased production of fissile 
material—China’s production halt is unofficial.263 Therefore, talks held absent Pakistan, 
India, Israel, the DPRK failed to address their own fissile material production and, as a 
consequence, the potential risk of material theft or misuse. Although seeking P5 talks in 
an effort to achieve at least some forward movement, the potential impact on non-NPT 
NWS has been a significant motivation for the administration’s interest in the treaty. In 
spite of this interest and its potential to further the President’s nuclear security aims, there 
appears to be an equal amount of resignation to the current state of affairs. At a 2015 
Conference on Disarmament, 19 countries, including the U.S., “reiterated previously held 
positions”264 With the Obama administration’s time running short, the statement suggests 
a willingness to stay involved in the FMCT development process while accepting 
gridlock for the foreseeable future.      
F. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1540  
Treaties, charters, and UN resolutions have offered the Obama administration 
opportunities to further its nonproliferation objectives and mitigate perceptions of 
unilateral strong-arming. UNSCR 1540 was passed in 2004 and mandated three primary 
obligations of UN states: states cannot support the procurement of WMD by non-state 
actors; and states must establish and enforce legislation barring transfer of WMD to non-
state actors; states must control WMD, delivery systems, and WMD-materials within 
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their territory.265 The resolution’s mandate has prompted the global community to 
address commercial proliferation by requiring the development of legal statutes targeting 
nuclear technologies.266 There has been little overt opposition to the resolution; however, 
concerns exist over how diligently countries are pursuing the resolution’s mandate. North 
Korea is the exception on having submitted no reports on UNSCR 1540 activities and 
refusing to detail internal nuclear security measures.267 In spite of the resolution’s 
approval among the global community, there is concern that the lack of enforcement has 
undermined UNSCR 1540’s effectiveness. 
1. Implementation 
Since taking office, the Obama administration has used UNSCR 1540 to promote 
its own efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. The administration approached support to 
UNSCR 1540 in two ways: by synchronizing domestic security and through bilateral 
support meant to facilitate implementation.268 The latter approach was captured in the 
UNSCR 1540 “assistance clause,” which states “in a position to do so to offer assistance 
as appropriate in response to specific requests.”269 Since 2009, the U.S. has submitted 
three National Progress Reports (NPR) to the UNSCR 1540 committee. Each report, the 
most recent in 2016, outlined newly developed policies aimed at supporting the 
resolution and how ongoing domestic nonproliferation measures have adopted 1540 
principles. Much of the domestic enhancement detailed to in the NPR has included the 
development of agency level-policies—i.e., DOD or DoE regulatory or security 
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improvements.270 A fair amount of these UNSCR 1540 supporting bullets are also 
updates or declarations of existing policies, and that the U.S. will afford UNSCR 1540 
requirements particular attention. In spite of the attention 1540 has received, however, 
there are significant implementation shortfalls within the United States. 
Although increasing 1540 support by promoting international commitments, the 
administration has struggled to fully implement the resolution at home. A 2016 
assessment conducted by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) captured U.S areas of risk 
and improvement since 2010. The report highlighted the large quantity of material in U.S. 
possession and the extensive number of nuclear material sites as vulnerabilities, while the 
lauding the administration’s improvement of international legal commitments—the 
CPPNM and ICSANT ratifications were seen as major steps forward.271 The report did 
not cite specific facilities or quantities as items of concern. However, a 2014 report on 
U.S. fissile material stockpiles noted the elimination and down-blending of 
approximately 23 metric tons of HEU and 4.4 tons of plutonium.272 Another 34 tons of 
plutonium had been earmarked for MOX conversion, but since the President’s decision to 
defund production at Savannah River, planners are seeking an alternative disposition. It is 
unclear what impact this delay might have as GTRI efforts continue to collect and 
repatriate materials to the United States. While domestic stockpiles may be declining, the 
administration’s full backing of GTRI’s repatriation efforts, most recently the sizable 
quantity of plutonium received from Japan, may become problematic if effective 
conversion or down-blending methods are not implemented.  
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2. Domestic Support 
Difficulties implementing the resolution were, however, mitigated by relatively 
widespread approval of the resolution among domestic leadership. In 2011 the 
administration invited the UNSCR 1540 Committee—the UN body charged with 
overseeing the resolutions execution—to conduct an implementation review. The 
resolution stipulates country visits with the approval of the state in question, and the 2011 
visit was the first for the United States and for the committee itself. Over 30 federal 
agencies and laboratories participated; activities included visits to sensitive nuclear 
facility storage and power sites.273 While there has not be a return visit—unsurprising 
given that the committee has only conducted 14 visits globally since the resolution’s 
inception—the meetings provided the administration an opportunity to establish the U.S. 
as a willing participant in the 1540 process.      
Congressional support to UNSCR 1540 has been largely positive, however, 
programs operating in coordination with Russia have been largely halted. Instead, the 
MENA region’s “relatively weak record of implementation” of UNSCR 1540, the Senate 
supported the (S.1021) Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013 
which called for CTR expansion into the region.274 The willingness to support expansion 
of UNSCR 1540-related activities offered opportunities to play a greater role in the 
MENA region and redirect funds away from programs operating in Russia.  
3. International Support 
The Obama administration provided significant support for foreign states in 
keeping with the assistance clause of UNSCR 1540. Existing nonproliferation programs 
like the CTR and GTRI have been cited as well suited for the task and are already 
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reinforcing the UNSCR 1540 mandate.275 Moreover, the CTR program expanded into the 
MENA region in an effort to target perceived implementation shortfalls. The 
administration has also invested heavily in enhancing foreign security. A.Q. Khan’s 
expansive proliferation activities and subsequent exposure in 2004 emphasized the need 
to address nuclear proliferation’s commercial component.276  
However, in spite of the administration’s support of UNSCR 1540, some consider 
it to be insufficient. Implementation of UNSCR 1540 is largely up to the state in question 
and there exists very little means of enforcement. David Albright is especially critical of 
the administration’s unwillingness to leverage the United States’ economic influence in 
support of UNSCR 1540 compliance.277 Albright also characterizes the lack of UNSCR 
1540 support by some countries as “outrageous.” He names Malaysia, the UAE, Iran, and 
Israel as permitting the smuggling or procurement of shipments in violation of the tenets 
of 1540.278 What “compliance” entails is not entirely clear. In 2014, the UNSC president 
called for “full implementation” of UNSCR 1540 by 2021; however, the methods and 
details of implementation appear to be largely up to the state in question.279  
G. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1887  
Like UNSCR 1540, UNSCR 1887 offered President Obama an internationally 
inclusive means of forwarding his nuclear security objectives. The resolution was 
personally presented to the United Nations Security Council on September 24, 2009, by 
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President Obama—it was adopted with unanimous support on the same day.280 Unlike 
UNSCR 1540, however, UNSCR 1887 was not primarily a means of thwarting would-be 
nuclear terrorists. Although frequently mentioning nuclear terrorism, the resolution 
focuses primarily on disarmament and continued pursuit of the measures outlined in the 
NPT.281 The resolution called for a renewal of existing efforts and an “endorsement of 
commitments under the NPT, the additional protocol, and UNSCR 1540.”282 Although 
UNSCR 1887 provided a means to reinforce the President’s broader nuclear security 
narrative, the absence of any enforcement mechanisms within the resolution shaped the 
resolution into more of a statement than a binding document. 
1. Implementation  
Early in his administration, President Obama committed the United States to a 
series of highly public events in an effort to promote his nonproliferation objectives. The 
Prague Speech, Nuclear Security Summits, and UNSCR 1887 provided the President 
avenues to showcase his conviction and willingness to grapple with nuclear security. In 
September of 2009, the President requested a UNSCR meeting, opting to chair the 
meeting himself—the first U.S. president to do so.283 At the meeting, the President 
requested that the resolution, which had originated as a U.S. concept paper and had been 
developed into a draft UNSCR prior to the meeting, be considered and adopted.284 
Passing unanimously, UNSCR 1887 was similar to other efforts by the administration in 
that it approached arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear terrorism collectively. The 
resolution was, however, somewhat vague in its interpretation of how these objectives 
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could be achieved. Much of the resolution’s language called for states to continue pursuit 
of objectives in the NPT or UNSCR 1540 without providing a new methods or 
mechanisms to do so. 
2. International Support 
The resolution itself was well received by the global community, but the UNSC 
meeting provided a forum for states to air ongoing grievances related to the NPT. Former 
U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, President Obama, and former French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy all highlighted Iran’s NPT non-compliance; meanwhile, the former 
President of China Hu Jintao argued that countries with the “largest arsenals should take 
lead” in disarmament.285 It seems apparent that given the opportunity to discuss the NPT 
participants would take jabs at NWS expressing their dissatisfaction with a lack of 
forward progress. However, the absence of any major enforcement mechanisms geared 
toward overcoming these grievances suggests a somewhat ineffective resolution. Aiden 
Warren highlights this shortfall, suggesting that UNSCR 1887 lacks substantive measures 
in support or enhancing nuclear security and arms reductions.286 Specifically, the 
resolution calls on non-NPT weapon states to “accede to the treaty as non-nuclear-
weapon states”—a tall order as it would require those non-members with weapons to 
completely divest themselves of said capability before joining.287 The net result is a 
resolution that serves to reinforce the administration’s apparent commitment to the NPT 
and nuclear security.  
H. CONCLUSION 
In his pursuit of a world protected from nuclear terrorism, President Obama often 
struggled to realize change. Citing the NPT in his historic Prague Speech and personally 
championing a security resolution, he took great effort to publically endorse his message. 
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Many in the global community responded positively and echoed his call to enhance 
global awareness of an array of nuclear matters.  
In many of his efforts, the President met with success and forwarded his vision of 
a more secure world. The 2010 NPT Review Conference was given renewed vigor and 
the President was lauded by numerous world leaders for his efforts. Ratification of the 
CPPNM and ICSANT bolstered the United States’ image as a world leader. Support for 
UNSCR 1540 has been enhanced, domestically and abroad. Since 2009, the U.S. has 
enhanced its own body of legislation and criminal law regarding nuclear security and 
nuclear terrorism. The net result has been a demonstrable willingness of the U.S. to 
become more deeply committed to measures combating nuclear terrorism. 
The administration has also failed to achieve objectives it laid out early on. As of 
the final months of the Obama administration, the President failed to realize a ratified 
CTBT or FMCT. President Obama was challenged to overcome desires within congress 
to preserve certain nuclear capabilities and his own pursuit of arms reductions. Although 
relating to his warnings over nuclear terrorism, the President was unable to persuade his 
detractors and largely ceased efforts to see either treaty to fruition. Having realized the 
CPPNM and ICSANT at the end of his administration, it remains to be seen how 
profoundly they may impact nuclear terrorism. Equally worrisome, deteriorating relations 
with Russia have had a significant negative impact on the administration’s international 
efforts. Overall, implementation of UNSCR 1540 and integration with foreign powers 
have largely expanded, but the U.S. and Russia activities are at a standstill. Furthermore, 
steps toward a more fully realized NPT appeared hopeful at the 2010 Review Conference. 
Since then, however, it appears that much momentum has been lost; the 2015 Review 
Conference was significantly less productive than the prior one.   
President Obama’s international efforts have been one facet of his broader 
approach to nuclear terrorism. Alongside domestically driven measures, the 
administration has promoted an array of nuclear security measures. Chapter IV assess the 
programs examined in Chapter II and III based on three areas of consideration. These are: 
have programs and polices been implemented and managed effectively—promoting and 
achieving goal oriented strategies while emphasizing efficient use of resources; has the 
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administration adequately fostered support within the United States to promote the 
President’s greater nonproliferation agenda; and has the administration achieved a shift in 













Because of the progress we made this week, and over recent years, more 
of the world’s nuclear material is secure. It’s harder for terrorists to get it. 
And as Commander in Chief, I want you to know that we’re going to keep 
doing everything in our power to keep our nation safe and strong and free. 
—President Barack Obama288 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks assesses the efforts outlined in Chapters II and III and answers 
the broader question of this thesis: have the Obama administration’s nonproliferation 
efforts reduced the threat of nuclear terrorism? This chapter consists of three sections. 
The first section is a brief discussion on major strategies and considerations that have 
characterized the administration’s approach. The second section is an effort-by-effort 
assessment of each program or policy discussed in Chapters II and III. The third section 
is a summation of the administration’s efforts and an evaluation what direction efforts to 
combat nuclear-terrorism are taking as a result. 
B. REPORT CARD 
The use of grades akin to a traditional academic-style report card is intended to 
provide a familiar and succinct assessment of the President’s efforts to reduce the threat 
of nuclear terrorism—taking significant inspiration from the Arms Control Association’s 
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament report.289 Each of the four categories, or 
grades, draws from the data presented in Chapters II and III. The alphabetical grade 
represents a quick-look answer to whether the administration’s efforts had any effect on 
the threat of nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, the qualitative analysis of each program looks 
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deeper than “was there an impact” and is meant to be indicative of how the 
administration sought to mitigate nuclear-terrorism within a rapidly changing geopolitical 
environment. The qualitative analysis in this chapter, combined with the supporting data 
in Chapters II and III, is not necessarily meant to be an exhaustive accounting akin to the 
multiple GAO reports cited in this work. Rather, as an assessment, this chapter seeks to 
evaluate the administration’s overall efforts, and whether or not the President was able to 
enhance the nuclear security architecture aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.  
The President’s ability to: implement programs effectively; garner domestic 
support; and motivate international actors will remain critical considerations. The 
absence of an actual nuclear attack by terrorists poses a significant hurdle when 
determining the efficacy of the administration’s related counter-terrorism efforts. There 
have been cases of nuclear theft—an event which could precipitate a nuclear attack. 
However, the preponderance of examples involve non-weapons-grade material or 
insufficient amounts of weapons-grade material.290 Therefore, based on unclassified 
information, it remains difficult to establish direct casual relationships.291 What we can 
surmise, however, is that enhancing the legal regime and securing both materials and 
weapons can have an effect—material security efforts are especially notable as they 
constitute a large share of the programs pursued by the administration. Efforts will be 
divided into four major categories for the purposes of grading and clarity: 
• High-impact “Grade A” efforts—Efforts that produced substantive results 
aimed at reducing nuclear terrorism AND mobilized the international 
community by cultivating a level of resolve that promoted action. 
• Effective “Grade B” efforts—Efforts that produced substantive results 
aimed at reducing nuclear terrorism OR efforts whose primary purpose 
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was to foster international cooperation in order to promote the completion 
of other objectives.  
• Moderately Effective “Grade C” efforts—Efforts that played a minor role 
invigorating international willingness but had little or no practical effect 
on the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
• Ineffective “Grade F” efforts—Efforts that, due to an inability to 
implement or through poor execution, failed to effect meaningful change.  
• Incomplete efforts—Programs, treaties, or polices included in stated 
objectives that were not met; however, efforts to see them commence, 
ratified, or approved are ongoing.  
 Prior to the assessment section, it may help to elaborate on overarching themes 
that significantly influenced the administration’s efforts or characterized its methodology. 
First, the administration’s approach to prevent nuclear-terrorism was integrative in 
nature. Second, the administration was forced to negotiate with a series of Congresses 
whose increasingly partisan preference complicated its efforts to reach objectives. Third, 
the significant deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations undermined and overshadowed 
much of the administration’s nuclear security efforts.  
C. STRATEGIES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Integrating Nuclear Efforts 
Since taking office, President Obama has approached nuclear security matters as 
series of distinct but critically linked challenges. The administration’s approach was an 
innovative take on the threat of nuclear terrorism that sought to integrate nonproliferation 
measures into a composite movement that could impact a myriad of nuclear matters. 
The President’s integrative method cast a wide a net in his effort to combat 
nuclear terrorism. Programs primarily focused on nuclear terrorism offered a direct 
method while semi-related programs, or programs that historically were complete 
unrelated, were capitalized on for their second and third-order effects. The approach 
appeared to consider that: 1) arms control measures reduce the number of weapons 
vulnerable to theft; 2) material production controls and physical security measures reduce 
the chances fissile material may be co-opted for weapons; and 3) nonproliferation 
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policies help to reduce and control the avenues in which nuclear-technology might travel. 
The recognition that there was a synergy across programs was undoubtedly recognized by 
planners prior to the President Obama; however, it appeared that he considered this 
approach to be particularly well-suited for his vision and made great effort to develop it 
beyond the policies of his predecessors. The President’s methods also became a vehicle 
through which to engage both Congress and the international community. The NPT 
conferences, UNSCR 1887, and the NSS series all provided a means of engaging 
audiences on multiple nuclear security matters simultaneously.  
2. Navigating Congress 
The Obama administration achieved support from Congress on a range of nuclear-
security issues, but not without significant difficulty. From 2009–2011 the administration 
enjoyed both a House and Senate party majority. Beginning in 2011, Republicans held a 
majority in just the House, and by 2015 Republicans held a majority in both the Senate 
and House. These power trends challenged the administration’s vision in two ways. First, 
the ever-present partisan politicking complicated the President’s ability to realize the 
quantitative support frequently required. In fairness, the President’s vision outlined in 
Prague was extensive, and to have accomplished it within four years would have required 
executive carte blanche—even the President admitted some of his objectives would not 
likely come to pass during his lifetime.  
During President Obama’s second term, however, this executive-legislative 
friction became especially acute. James Read characterized this phenomenon as a period 
of “hyper-partisanship” where intense polarization by each political party emphasized a 
focus on party-over-policy, undermining the effectiveness of Congress to legislate.292 
The result was an unwillingness to integrate the policy approval ratings and a greater 
inclination to stay within party lines.293   
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The resulting political environment was a challenge to navigate and hindered 
President Obama’s approach to confront nuclear terrorism in a manner of his choosing. In 
some cases the President met with success with congressional work-arounds vis-à-vis 
CPPNM and ICSANT—both conventions were essentially legislative riders. In the case 
of the CTBT, the President appears to have conceded, acknowledging that current 
conditions made pursuit futile. As a result, some of his objectives remained tabled until a 
future administration opts to reinvigorate them. The administration’s calculus was similar 
with international actors as well. While beginning strong, deteriorating U.S.–Russian 
relations forced the administration to adapt its nuclear security objectives. 
3. U.S.–Russian Relations   
As a nation with the world’s largest stockpiles of fissile materials and weapons, 
Russia played an important role in the administration’s efforts to combat nuclear 
terrorism.294 Decades-long efforts geared at securing or eliminating weapons and 
material largely came to a halt between 2013 and 2014 (see Figure 2). Russia’s desire to 
interact with the U.S. on more equal footing played an important role in its withdrawal 
from cooperative agreements.295 Furthermore, Russian aggression in Ukraine prompted a 
similar withdrawal on behalf of U.S. leadership, prompting a halt in funding and 
condemnation from the administration.   
Cooling relations with Russia was critical to this paper as it directly affected 
many of the efforts outlined; however, the phenomenon’s impact on the resulting grading 
scheme is not always a direct one. A full exploration of whether President Obama could 
have kept relations with Russia “warm” is outside the scope of this paper; however, at a 
glance, he was not left with many choices. The President’s options were, broadly 
speaking, a diplomatic or military approach. The military approach would likely have 
failed to maintain positive relations; the use of Afghanistan to wage proxy war, for 
example. The President opted for a more diplomatic response; this method has met with 
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similar lack of success insofar as maintaining cooperative dialogue.296 It appears unlikely 
that the President could have fully staved off the cascade of events that led to the current 
nature of U.S.–Russian relations and the resulting decline in the established nuclear 
security sharing between the U.S. and Russia. 
 
Figure 2.  Timeline of Nonproliferation Efforts 
Nevertheless, the impact failing relations had on President Obama’s nuclear-
terrorism measures will remain an important factor—CTR, SLD, and GTRI activities 
have all suffered a marked loss of scope or discontinued entirely. Consideration will be 
given to the nature of this impact in the context of the program or effort being graded. 
Ultimately, nuclear security was just one of the many unfortunate victims as national 
interests clashed. 
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D. REPORT CARD 
1. High-Impact Grade A Efforts 
Within the suite of nonproliferation measures used by the administration each 
approach addressed the threat of nuclear terrorism in its own way. As discussed above, 
the effectiveness of many efforts was not entirely a product of its scope or capabilities, 
but the willingness of other nations to commit to the endeavor. Programs categorized as 
high-impact, or grade A, were implemented effectively by the administration and 
provided both innovative and effective ways to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism 
while maintaining strong support from both the domestic and international audience. This 
category includes the following programs: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Security Summits, and 
UNSCR 1540.  
a. GTRI 
The President’s GTRI efforts reduced the net amount of vulnerable nuclear 
material around the globe, effectively denying it from would-be nuclear terrorists. 
Industry experts involved in the program reacted quickly to the administration’s warning 
of nuclear terrorism and executed a sweeping global material-security program.297 By 
following his Prague declarations with action, the President began his strategy of 
integration early on. Married to the idea of combating nuclear-terrorism, capabilities 
offered by the GTRI provided a means to facilitate material removal in nations that, prior 
to the Four-Year Effort, had little reason to invest themselves in counter-terrorism 
programs of a nuclear nature. Moreover, the initiative’s reinvigorated efforts bolstered 
UNSCR 1540 and PSI activities already underway. 
The result, many states that had possessed fissile material for fairly long periods, 
sometimes decades or more, voiced their consent for GTRI involvement and the 
material’s subsequent removal. The President also enjoyed a relatively long period of 
support from Congress for GTRI activities—cast as a counter-terrorism, measure material 
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security became a more attractive venture to get behind. The net result was the removal 
or enhanced security of tens of thousands of kilograms in 11 countries.  
Consequently, the administration’s use of the GTRI made a valuable impact; 
however, the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations bodes poorly for the initiative’s 
foreseeable future. A few of the activities under the initiative’s purview, such as reactor 
conversion, have been effectively halted—a significant proliferation concern as Russia 
still operates dozens of HEU reactors.  
As with other programs, this has spurred the administration’s pivot toward a more 
global approach, and GTRI efforts elsewhere continue to be planned. The administration 
did manage to maintain the U.S.–Russia material repatriation process of the GTRI, so as 
efforts to secure material outside of Russia continue, they remain able to return Russian-
origin materials. In this case the relationship itself is, perhaps, more important than the 
nonproliferation benefits of seeing material back to Russia. Nonproliferation programs 
often trace their success to the interpersonal relationships that are built and sustained 
among program participants—long after administrations have changed, the industry 
professionals often remain.298 Consequently, the administration’s efforts to promote 
continued GTRI activity beyond its final term may, in the future, facilitate dialogue to 
promote more productive nonproliferation activity. 
b. GICNT 
President Obama’s support of the GICNT has enhanced the international 
community’s response capacity to combat nuclear terrorist threats. Moreover, the 
administration’s efforts have helped the program evolve into a more durable institution 
and provided an ongoing link with Russia where other avenues of cooperation have 
collapsed. Compared to programs like the CTR or treaties like the NPT, the GICNT is a 
comparatively small part of the global nuclear-security regime—it lacks official tasking 
authority and has a miniscule budget compared to other similarly scoped programs. 
Nevertheless, this dynamic is what makes the program so cost-effective. It facilitates and 
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executes its mandate well: conducting practical exercises; enhancing cooperation among 
the security and scientific communities; and sharing information to improve partner 
nation capacity.  
In effect, the GICNT has provided a means for each nation to connect its federal 
nuclear-security apparatus with those of other nations, and other non-governmental 
nuclear-security practitioners. By enhancing international communication and hosting 
“war-game” like events, the initiative offers a means to get in front of the threat and 
develop both preventative measures and after-event responses. Like professional 
exchanges under the CTR program before it, the GICNT has offered nuclear security 
practitioners a forum to connect. In a relatively small community, developing 
interpersonal connections among program participants is not an unimportant activity; a 
2012 NAS report argues that these relationships are among “the main products of a 
successful capacity-building program.”299 Also beneficial, war-gaming threats among 
international actors offered training to the nuclear security practitioners. The GICNT’s 
table top exercises have facilitated a means to work through the logistical and 
bureaucratic minutiae that, during crisis, may be vital to a timely response. President 
Obama had a direct hand in enhancing this capability by promoting the formation of the 
IAG—a body within the GICNT tasked with facilitating the same events.  
It remains unclear, however, how well the GICNT will continue to function 
should Russia opt to step down, or fail to be selected as co-chair. Again, as with many 
other programs the ability of the U.S. to influence this eventuality is limited, but Russia’s 
departure from the initiative would have a profound impact on its effectiveness. Based on 
the growing list of participants, it is unlikely the GICNT itself would be in jeopardy 
should Russia bow out; however, the initiative’s reach would undoubtedly suffer. As an 
addition to the administration’s nonproliferation regime, the GICNT has been a cost-
effective means of engaging and integrating with the international community. 
Furthermore, the initiative offers a mechanism to maintain communication with Russia 
where other avenues have fallen silent. Should relations with Russia deteriorate further, 
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or if Russia decides to withdraw of GICNT activities of their own accord, dialogue would 
only become further strained. The NSS faced a similar hitch, as the summits progressed 
and President Putin came to power, Russia’s willingness to engage on nuclear security 
declined significantly.  
c. Nuclear Security Summits (NSS)  
The NSS had a profound impact on the threat of nuclear terrorism by providing 
the political momentum needed to promote change and a forum for international action 
(see Figure 3). Collectively, the summits formed the capstone of the administration’s 
nuclear security legacy and provided the President a means to revisit and renew his 
message of nuclear security throughout his presidency. More practically, the summits 
were a method of international engagement that largely circumvented Congressional 
interference. 
The summits gave shape to the President’s declarations in Prague, and his 
personal involvement as both a participant and leader cultivated his apparent sense of 
commitment to nuclear security. Activities at each NSS also provided a means to refocus 
efforts on particular issues, be they the UNSCR 1540 implementation, material security 
efforts, or cooperation on nuclear energy. Furthermore, the President also capitalized on 
his position within the summits to reassure the international community that the U.S. was 
still strongly pursuing CPPNM and ICSANT ratification even while finding less support 
domestically.300 The agreeable atmosphere at the summits that made this possible was 




                                                 
300 Roth, “Congress Gives Thumbs Up to International Nuclear Security Conventions.” 
 87 
 
Figure 3.  Results of the Nuclear Security Summits 2010–2016301 
Each event was streamlined by inviting specifically selected participants who 
were amicable to new or enhanced nuclear security measures—a tactic pursued with a 
focus on timely results.302 The President’s decision to hand pick participants was, 
arguably, a prudent option. Combined with a heavy media presence, the net effect was a 
forum that “created peer pressure” among participants and promoted practical change 
while avoiding empty pledges—an effect captured by a high frequency of gift-baskets 
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(refer to Figure 3) presented at each summit.303 Designed to be a personal affair, world 
leaders often conversed directly on nuclear-security issues, giving them momentum 
absent at the lower levels of governance. 
The summits provided both the beginning and the backbone for the 
administration’s nuclear security efforts. As a reoccurring event, they reinforced the 
President’s message that there was more to be done and that it was the responsibility of 
each leader that global nuclear security began at home. The willingness of President 
Obama to place the onus of security on those present was a bold move, Kenneth Luongo 
considered the President to have “put his personal prestige on the line like no other world 
leader has before on the nuclear issue.”304 Ultimately, this investment appears to have 
paid off and a multitude of countries have pledged and completed significant changes 
aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
d. UNSCR 1540 
For the duration of the Obama administration, UNSCR 1540 implementation has 
been inextricably tied to the NSS. The resolution was a speaking point fixed into the 
summits and was considered to be a “cornerstone of a reinvigorated non-proliferation 
regime.”305 The summits created an environment where UNSCR 1540 compliance was 
questioned and explored, in keeping with the summit’s focus on concrete change many 
states opted to commit themselves to full compliance through gift-baskets. Encouraging 
implementation in this manner was a creative approach to a problem that had existed 
since the resolution’s inception—pressuring states into compliance without alienating 
leadership and putting further cooperation at risk. The administration monitored these 
pledges to determine whether the commitment was genuine.  
In keeping with his integrative method, the President also leveraged UNSCR 
1540’s ability to facilitate a broader range of nuclear-security matters. The resolution 
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acted as a nexus of nuclear-security by providing the legal and political momentum to 
weave threat reduction activities (GTRI, CTR, SLD) into a UN-sponsored effort. The 
administration’s willingness to lend material and technical support—captured in the 
resolution’s assistance-clause—bolstered President Obama’s apparent commitment to the 
issue. Critics argue that national economic interests will continue to undermine UNSCR 
1540, as establishing tighter import/export controls will likely hinder good business.306 
Here again, the NSS offered a means to promote UNSCR 1540 compliance by putting 
countries “on stage” during the NSS. This was, however, executed with the need to 
preserve face and promote international sovereignty while simultaneously allowing U.S. 
nuclear security activities to move forward. 
This administration met with less success when confronting Russia. The 
resolution benefits from its origins and multilateral nature, components that will likely 
prevent Russia’s cloistering to an extent similar to the SLD or CTR. As the U.S. pivots 
away from active cooperation with Russia, it remains to be seen how much ongoing 
efforts can influence Russia’s security preferences. Therefore, the administration’s shift 
away from the country may be one of the few near-term solutions to bolster nuclear 
security until Russia is willing to reengage.  
2. Effective Grade B Efforts 
a. CTR  
During the Obama administration the CTR program suffered its greatest defeat 
but may have begun a promising second life. The program provided an opportunity to 
integrate a storied threat reduction program into the administration’s broader nuclear-
security narrative. Since the downturn in U.S.–Russian relations, however, the 
administration began a pivot toward a more globally minded CTR program. 
As a legacy program, the administration’s use of the CTR was a continuation of 
earlier efforts—letting the program do what it did best was generally the approach early 
on. As very much a bilateral effort with Russia—activities occurring in other nations, like 
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Kazakhstan, generally dealt with Russian-owned weapons and material—the established 
relationships carried the program’s activities until 2013. Russia’s refusal to renew the 
program in 2013 had a profound impact on nonproliferation efforts and, while plans to 
expand outside of the historic Russia-centric framework existed prior to 2013, the shift 
hastened the Obama administration’s pivot to a more global approach.  
Proposals for an expansion of CTR activities occurred early in President Obama’s 
first term—expansion into the MENA and Asia were on the administration’s to-do list 
from the onset and nested well in the President’s narrative of countering nuclear-
terrorism. The President also benefited from CTR’s broad support in Congress and used 
this to his advantage. Congress’s halt on funding for Russian-CTR activity paralleled the 
President’s push for sanctions; there was little debate between the executive and 
legislative that until Russian aggression in the Ukraine ended the flow of money should 
come to a halt. Furthermore, the administration’s preference for multilateral activities 
complimented ongoing congressional motions to expand the CTR—captured by the Next 
Generation CTR Act of 2013 and CTR Modernization Act. This simultaneous expansion 
and contraction were the most critical shifts in the program during the Obama 
administration, and perhaps since the program’s inception.  
Overall the administration handled CTR activities well, leading up to the falling 
out with Russia. Short of appeasement in Ukraine, it is unlikely the President could have 
maintained amicable relations with the Kremlin. How fast the U.S. can expand activities 
is, however, a critical next step. Should the President’s pivot to a more globally minded 
CTR program blossom, it could occupy a niche activity for continued nonproliferation 
measures. The DOS and DOE have a powerful motivation in maintaining CTR 
activities—even a greatly reduced CTR budget still draws hundreds of millions in 
funding—so there remains a profound institutional interest in both organizations.307 
Retaining congressional support appears equally likely, the program affords legislative 
representatives a method of personally investing in a generally popular program aimed at 
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promoting nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism.308 With the domestic 
willingness and technical means in place, continued CTR success falls largely in the 
hands of future administrations to sustain domestic funding and international willingness 
to participate.   
b. Second Line of Defense  
During the Obama administration, the SLD program increased the global capacity 
to detect nuclear smuggling, but an inability to conclusively demonstrate effectiveness 
and diplomatic friction with Russia greatly undermined the program’s impact on the risk 
of smuggling to terrorists. At face value, the program did enhance the number of 
monitoring stations globally—increasing the total number of sites by more than 450 sites 
between 2008 and 2016. Furthermore, it facilitated the administration’s integrative 
approach, offering a mechanism to support the UNSCR 1540 mandate. 
In spite of forward progress, unclear metrics played a role in declining support 
from the administration. Holistically, the program’s purpose is to establish an 
international nuclear-detection framework. In spite of unclear metrics, it has arguably 
done so by establishing an increasing number of detection sites around the globe. 
Furthermore, reports indicate that while rare, the system has successfully detected a 
number of nuclear smuggling attempts. However, limited resources and the pursuit of 
other security objectives prompted the administration to reduce funding. Leadership 
within the NNSA echoed the administration’s choice as necessary to “prioritize its 
resources.”309 Institutional interests and branch loyalties may have played a role as the 
NNSA is, by way of the DOE, subordinate to the executive branch. Congress has 
successfully overruled executive pressures to reduce funding at times; however, in spite 
of their successes overall funding for SLD continues to decline.  
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Combined with budget reductions, the withdrawal of Russia from the program 
was a unique blow to SLD activities. As a consequence of Russia’s unwillingness to 
continue coordinating on sites within its borders, the condition of roughly 300 sites is 
now unknown; additionally, over 80 sites in Ukraine have been deactivated or destroyed. 
Whether these sites could have been repatriated or secured prior to hostilities is unknown, 
but the loss of so many sites has undoubtedly undermined the ability of SLD to act as an 
early-warning network.  
President Obama’s desire to see funding moved elsewhere may be the most 
prudent option for the foreseeable future. In keeping with his integrative approach, the 
program remains a useful mechanism to forward UNSCR 1540, PSI, and GICNT 
activities. Proponents of the program are widespread, so it does not appear SLD is 
doomed.310 Furthermore, the program’s physical nature provides a means of reinforcing 
the administration’s rhetoric—a useful outlet when seeking to validate U.S. commitment 
among international partners. 
3. Moderately Effective Grade C Efforts 
a. UNSCR 1887 
The UNSCR 1887 was just such rhetoric. The resolution was primarily concerned 
with reinforcing existing efforts, namely the NPT, and acted as more of a “morale-
builder”—absent were any new commitments. In fairness to the administration, this 
appeared to be the intent of the resolution—establishing and reinforcing the President’s 
pledge to nuclear security was a sensible first step after assuming office. Case in point, 
President Obama chaired the UNSCR 1887 proposal meeting personally, a deliberate 
maneuver that sought to demonstrate his willingness to lead from the front.  
Free from any new substantive objectives, however, the resolution’s effect was 
slight. Like the President’s repeated invoking of the NPT, it offered a relatively 
inexpensive way to grasp the international community’s attention and demonstrate U.S. 
commitment to combating nuclear terrorism. Within the context of the efforts discussed 
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in this work, the resolution was a useful but minor addition. Nevertheless, it was an 
effective way to kick-start the President’s vision of an enhanced global nuclear security 
regime and like his use of the NPT, offered a means of reinforcing his warnings of 
nuclear terrorism to the world.  
b. NPT  
Like UNSCR 1887, the administration’s handling of the NPT ended up being 
largely political. Early and frequent references to strengthen the NPT reinforced the 
global perception that, in spite of an aggressive campaign seeking to secure nuclear 
materials, the administration still honored nations’ right to use peaceful nuclear energy. 
Furthermore, the President’s calls for a nuclear-weapon-free world bolstered his apparent 
commitment to matters of nuclear security and lent credibility to his willingness to 
engage issues multilaterally—the 2010 NPR stated pursuit of the NPT was an effective 
means of reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime and securing materials.311 
 Beyond this political and, perhaps, emotional reinvigoration, there was only 
minor progress made toward a more fully realized NPT. Rather, the NPT continued to act 
as the “backbone” to other programs meant to combat proliferation. Using the NPT as a 
means of support was, perhaps, the President’s most effective means of integrating it into 
his overall narrative. The PSI, UNSCR 1540, ICSANT, and other efforts have essentially 
become the action-agents of the NPT’s broader nonproliferation message.  
Toward the end of his second term, however, invoking the NPT lost its 
effectiveness. An inability to reach consensus at the 2015 NPT Review Conference—
complicated by U.S. support for Israel—and a proposed expansion in U.S. nuclear 
weapons funding undermined the administration’s credibility in the eyes of foreign 
nations. Ultimately, including the NPT into its nuclear security efforts was an easy 
method to catapult a message. However, this effect would fade over time. 
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c. CPPNM and ICSANT 
The administration’s ability to see the CPPNM and ICSANT ratified was a 
victory for nonproliferation proponents; however, success arrived so late that earnest 
implementation has only just begun. Nevertheless, achieving ratification is itself a 
forward step. Both conventions reflect a growing global recognition that both 
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts can be enhanced by constructing an 
equally robust legal framework. Consequently, their ratification bodes well for President 
Obama’s integrative approach. The GTRI and CTR generally pursue physical nuclear 
security for both weapons and material; whereas, the CPPNM and ICSANT look to 
establish legal measures that prevent, deter, or head-off the act of proliferation itself.  
The means of ratification was, however, indicative of the administration’s strategy 
to overcome domestic resistance. Only by attaching each document to legislation 
primarily concerned with an unrelated issue (domestic data collection) did the 
administration finally achieve success. Each convention has subsequently, and quietly, 
entered into U.S. law. The President’s desire to lead the world in nuclear security was 
stymied at times by the United States’ absence from treaties and conventions that enjoyed 
broad international support. Moreover, both the CPPNM and ICSANT directly address 
matters of nuclear terrorism and material security, both cornerstones of the Obama 
administration’s Prague Agenda. The administration’s success in ratifying each 
convention has avoided passing the same burden onto another administration. However, 
barring a significant change of course in the next administration, each convention will 
take time to integrate into the broader nuclear-security architecture pursued by the Obama 
administration. Reworking existing laws and developing new ones is a multilayered 
process that will, in time, greatly define the efficacy of both conventions. The challenges 
associated with integrating global nonproliferation requirements with domestic law 
played a large role in the administration’s inability to realize some of its nuclear security 
objectives.    
 95 
4. Ineffective Grade F Efforts 
CTBT 
The failure to ratify the CTBT is perhaps the most glaring shortfall of the 
administration’s nonproliferation efforts. Ratification was a stated objective and the 
failure to do so was largely due to an inability to reach an accord between the President 
and Congress—so much so the President opted to not submit the document for approval 
at all. In some respects the President’s decision to pursue other nonproliferation measures 
was a prudent one. The shrewd expenditure of political capital to see other efforts to 
fruition necessitated a willingness to avoid submitting the CTBT to congress until 
ratification became a realistic goal. However, the CTBT was part of the President’s 
overall nonproliferation architecture. His integrative approach appeared to view success 
as the summation of numerous measures working in concert to form a vast 
nonproliferation regime. As a result, the failure to ratify the CTBT left the U.S. out of a 
measure that may have gained valuable political capital. While indirectly effecting 
nuclear terrorism, inclusion of the U.S. into the CTBT would enhance the United States’ 
negotiating power with other non-signatories who may be proliferation risks themselves. 
5. Incomplete Grades  
FMCT  
Like the CTBT, the FMCT appears to have been identified as a less-than-viable 
endeavor by the administration. As his efforts moved forward, the President was faced 
with valuing efforts increasingly based of their apparent return. Also like the CTBT, the 
FMCT would not reveal itself as such. This is not to say it lacked the potential to reduce 
nuclear terrorism. In theory, the FMCT closely paralleled the President’s material 
security efforts as captured by the Four-Year Effort. Discord throughout the global 
community—an inability to agree on key facets of what may become a FMCT—has 
hindered forward progress.  
Unlike the CTBT, however, the FMCT appears to be more of an incomplete effort 
than a failed one as a result of its ongoing development. The CTBT has been established; 
therefore U.S. participation lies solely on U.S. shoulders. Conversely, the FMCT remains 
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a work in progress. The administration has directed subordinate agencies to reinvigorate 
the FMCT—notably the “work-around” P5 conference proposed by Rose Gottenmoeller. 
As the administration settled in, however, it became apparent that within the suite of 
nonproliferation efforts already in motion, the FMCT may not be a viable pursuit. An 
increasingly partisan Congress did little to support the treaty reworks that may have 
facilitated development, but blaming Washington would ignore the international friction 
over what conditions the treaty should include.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The Obama administration’s nonproliferation efforts have played an important 
role in reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism to the homeland, but there remains much 
to be done. Barring the incomplete grades the administration earned a weak B, making 
significant forward progress, effecting real physical change, and building international 
will to further institutionalize nuclear security efforts. Shortfalls remain; critics cite 
significant gaps in the nonproliferation architecture as critical deficits in the 
administration’s overall efforts.312 Furthermore, dwindling budgets threaten to undermine 
much of the progress made.313 Yet there does not appear to be a camp arguing that the 
past eight years have been in vain.  
The administration’s methods also have significant implications for the future of 
nonproliferation measures, particularly those geared at combating nuclear terrorism. The 
first method was the active integration of nonproliferation measures in an attempt to 
achieve objectives through multiple means. The second was being able to adapt 
nonproliferation strategy to significant geopolitical shifts, in this case the inability to 
secure high levels of cooperation with the international community.  
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1. Next Generation Policy Approach 
The Obama administration’s integrative nonproliferation efforts have reduced the 
threat of nuclear terrorism by enhancing the global political-legal regime and 
strengthening physical nuclear security. Policies that may have been wholly in the realm 
of arms control or disarmament were tied to the threat of nuclear terrorism—first in 
rhetoric, then in practice. As an approach to nuclear terrorism, this deliberate system of 
integration was effective in two important ways.  
First, the President’s integrative method sought to build a nuclear-security 
architecture that used complementary capabilities to reinforce other efforts and create 
redundancies. Reducing weapons, material, and the production of both were pursued as 
methods of denying both to terrorists. Furthermore, efforts offered complementary 
qualities in the form of access. The growing framework of treaties and conventions 
supported by the administration afforded a means of acceptability involving the U.S. in 
foreign activities. Case in point: the PSI, SLD, and GICNT have often become 
components of UNSCR 1540 compliance; and the NSS greatly facilitated GTRI and CTR 
activities abroad. Codifying efforts as counter-terrorism measures, and associating them 
where possible with other popular initiatives, assisted the administration’s aggressive 
material security efforts. This technique was less successful within the domestic 
audience.  
Second, associating efforts or policies with terrorism was a useful method to 
mobilize support. In this case, the President desired to engage a range of audiences in his 
nuclear security efforts—the international community, Congress, and, to a lesser degree 
the U.S. public. This is not to say that the President disingenuously leveraged the notion 
of terrorism to advance unrelated objectives. The 2010 NPR identified nuclear terrorism 
as a top priority of the administration—a distinct paradigm shift from prior NPR’s that 
continued to emphasize cold-war weapons doctrine.314  
His approach was genuine in that nuclear security is very much a collection of 
interconnected programs whose contributions to one another may not be immediately 
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noticeable. This does not, however, imply that the President was ignorant of the impact 
and political value of associating terrorism with the myriad of nonproliferation measures 
in effect—a technique used less prudently by the media.315 As witnessed during the 2010 
NPT Review Conference and the Nuclear Security Summits, the global audience was 
highly receptive to the President’s nuclear-terrorism message.  
In spite of the administration’s success, shortfalls remain, particularly in areas of 
compliance and enforcement. In many cases the burden is a global one, frequently resting 
on the shoulders of the UN, at least in writing. Diligent compliance with UNSCR 1540 
remains spotty, and while the administration’s GTRI, CTR, and SLD efforts have 
provided means to support implementation, much work remains to be done.316 
Exacerbated by an apparent downward trend in funding it is possible that progress may 
halt, or even backslide, in coming years. Yet, for the moment, there has been significant 
progress. President Obama raised the nonproliferation bar quite high, and with concerted 
assistance from the international community, it can remain relatively high for the 
foreseeable future.  
2. Remaining Responsive—The Post-Russia Pivot  
The importance of international cooperation is why the U.S.-Russian downturn is 
so troubling. It has had a significantly negative impact on ongoing nonproliferation 
activities while simultaneously creating conditions for a potentially positive expansion 
away from a global nonproliferation regime dominated by bilateral programs. Programs 
like the CTR and SLD were defined by the bipolar-context in which they were created 
and have faced a massive loss of operability in the face of failed relations.  
The administration and the nuclear security industry have, however, remained 
responsive and began adapting nonproliferation measures to a landscape where Russia is 
absent. Programs like the CTR have looked to the MENA for work while SLD activities 
carry on in spite of significant losses. Meanwhile, already multilateral activities like the 
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GICNT may become a more turbulent forum—as Russia and the U.S. co-chaired the 
organization. It is highly unlikely the organization will dissolve due mounting friction 
between each country; however, members may opt to not elect Russia as a co-chair, or 
even the U.S. for that matter, out of concern U.S.-Russian tensions may undermine the 
program’s broader pursuits.  
The administration’s policy efforts have positively impacted nonproliferation 
measures and postured the United States well for future dealings. The U.S. has gained 
credibility among international players and reduced opportunities for Russia to claim 
abuses by unilateral U.S.-operations.317 As U.S.–Russian activities are in the decline, the 
U.S. is now postured to capitalize on the goodwill earned over the past eight years and 
continue expanding multilateral initiatives. The United States’ deeper integration into the 
global legal framework is, therefore, as much a pivot away from bilateral U.S.-Russian 
programs as it is a pivot away from the practice of bilateral programs themselves. The 
continuing expansion of Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence offer concrete linkages 
that stand to reinforce the past eight years of nonproliferation cooperation—the recently 
opened center in China for example. By growing the number of centers globally, and 
specifically into weapon states, the post-Russia pivot has an opportunity to manifest more 
physically and, ideally, more permanently. The IAEA involvement in many of these 
centers also assists in mitigating any bilateral undertones and weaving them into the 
growing network of global nonproliferation institutions.  
Bilateral nonproliferation programs are unlikely to be discarded entirely, but it 
does appear multilateral initiatives are increasingly preferred. The administration’s pivot 
away from Russia and pursuit of this more global dynamic is, therefore, in keeping with 
the contemporary geopolitical environment.  
The Obama administration witnessed the end of the CTR as many practitioners 
had come to define it for decades. Therefore, the need to promote semi-autonomous 
initiatives (like the PSI or GICNT) offers more robust opportunities that reduce 
continuity gaps and avoid unilateral or bilateral dependencies. Nuclear energy continues 
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to proliferate and with it technology that is of use to would-be nuclear terrorists. The two-
decade long focus on Russian facilities and stockpiles is evolving into a global one. 
President Obama and the array of nuclear-security practitioners have, since 2009, reduced 
the threat of nuclear terrorism to the homeland. Looking to the future, however, 
significant challenges remain. Decreasing budgets threaten to halt the momentum gained 
over the past eight years. Supporting and expanding the nonproliferation architecture that 
President Obama and his predecessors have built remains a necessary step in the pursuit 















The next President, and those nuclear security practitioners that form the current 
workforce, continued to face a number nonproliferation challenges. While the Obama 
administration has taken great strides toward enhancing the U.S. and global 
nonproliferation framework, there remains much to be done. To that end, this chapter 
includes a brief list of recommendations to the administration following 
President Obama’s.  
B. CONTINUE THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH  
Continuing to approach nuclear security and nuclear terrorism as a multifaceted 
threat is necessary to maintain the breadth of capabilities needed to cope with the full 
spectrum of issues that constitute the threat. The Obama administration’s integrative 
methodology sought to leverage programs often far removed from what one might 
consider a direct terrorist threat, such as linking arms control and disarmament to nuclear 
security and nuclear terrorism. While potentially indirect and hard to treat as a single 
issue, maintaining this approach can pay dividends over the long term. Reducing the 
availability of nuclear weapons and nuclear material similarly reduces the threat of theft 
by terrorists. Building coalitions and collaborative enterprises promotes the sharing of 
expertise and intelligence. The focus must remain on creating conditions that prohibit the 
procurement or development of a nuclear weapon capability, first in states and then by 
terrorists who may gain access to a nation’s nuclear assets. Promoting a comprehensive 
and multifaceted nuclear security architecture can help to ensure that every base 
is covered.  
This approach relies as much on nature of nonproliferation practitioners as the 
programs themselves. Capitalizing on the second and third order benefits nonproliferation 
efforts yield can create an expansive and purposefully redundant architecture aimed at 
impeding weapons and material procurement. Incentivizing this cooperation at the user 
level remains equally necessary. Creating conditions where practitioners can exchange 
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information across agencies, and where necessary between nations, is necessary to 
underpin the administrative framework of a truly integrated nonproliferation 
architecture.318  
C. REACH AN ACCORD WITH CONGRESS 
The need to realize support from Congress is a frequent and necessary challenge 
for any administration seeking to enhance the domestic and international nonproliferation 
architecture. Nuclear security has a long history of bipartisan support and need not be 
embroiled in political strife. Future administrations will need to develop strategies to 
overcome Congressional resistance should the trend of hyper partisanship continue. 
Where executive influence alone fails, Presidents must be willing to reach out to 
nonproliferation and security practitioners to build support for nonproliferation 
measures.319 I would be prudent for a new President to develop a game plan for engaging 
the Hill of nuclear security matters and coordinate with majority and minority Hill 
leaders to facilitate favorable consideration of funding for programs.  
Enlisting the aid of security leaders and nonproliferation experts could help to 
alleviate partisan undertones. The success of nonproliferation measures is often measured 
over years, and it would bode poorly for any effort if it began with a narrow margin of 
support. Seeking support from nonproliferation practitioners, in both the government and 
private sector, would go a long way in helping to illustrate to Congressional leadership 
the levels of risk associated with failing to fund certain efforts.320  
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D. CLARIFY RISK TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE FUNDING 
Developing a specific funding brackets and what level of risk is associated with 
each could enhance the prioritization of funds; furthermore, it would establish codified 
levels of risk that policy opponents would be forced to mitigate or accept. Few if any 
government functions benefit from erratic funding cycles, but nonproliferation measures 
are acutely affected. A glut of funds may prompt unwise spending on fruitless objectives, 
while insufficient, unpredictable, stop-and-start funding undermines thoughtful 
implementation.  
Therefore, to effectively develop an enduring nonproliferation framework, the 
next administration would benefit from less varied funding trends. Ultimately, and 
somewhat unfortunately, this is a question of establishing a politically viable balance 
between funding for the nuclear security enterprise and the resulting level of risk – both 
strongly influenced by executive and Congressional voting cycles.  
While it is the job of Congressional representatives to secure funding, 
nonproliferation practitioners owe them a clear picture of what levels of risk are being 
accepted at specific levels of funding. Codifying risk at each level would somewhat 
imprecise as the threat of terrorism must often be gauged on what little intelligence may 
exist. Yet, threat and risk must be known to those managing funds; they can help to 
illustrate to Congressional leadership what risk the U.S. would be accepting should a 
policy or program fail to be provided adequate funds.321 This practice already occurs to a 
certain extent, however, shifts in funding at the agency level frequently fail to incorporate 
input on how it may fully influence national security. Establishing a tiered risk-funding 
pictured for decision makers would, hopefully, enhance clarity on threats to the U.S. and 
allow leadership to position funds based on an informed sense of risk.  
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E. PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS IN NUCLEAR 
SECURITY 
Promoting buy-in from the international community is necessary to develop and 
maintain an effective global nonproliferation architecture. While some states, such as 
Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, and India, may have conflicting energy, security, and 
economic interests that dampen their enthusiasm for enhanced nuclear security measures, 
others have little to fear from nuclear terrorism and may be more willing to support 
efforts like UNSCR1540 or SLD.  
President Obama’s NSS efforts were notably successful in overcoming these 
complex interests to maintain a very broad international coalition. The nuclear security 
summits demonstrated U.S. commitment to nonproliferation matters and in many cases, 
quite literally, put state leaders in the spotlight with President Obama. Promoting the 
interests of willing stakeholders is the glue that holds the NSS coalition together.  
There are a range of methods to promote stakeholders. The NSS provided an 
effective means of leveraging political will. Combining that will with economic 
incentives, positive and negative, could go a long way in bolstering nonproliferation 
measures.  
Finally, continuing the Nuclear Security Summit process may be useful option. 
The momentum develops so far could be perpetuated and channeled to the next set of 
challenges. The NSS or an equivalent forum is needed to maintain the focus of the global 
community on the full range of nuclear dangers. Expanding the group could incorporate 
additional stakeholders and maintain awareness among national decision makers. 322 
Building on the success of the NSS would provide opportunities to support the NPT and 
its Review Conferences, and maintain important elements of the global nonproliferation 
regime. Even without a follow on NSS, it will be critical to engage the global community 
in constructive dialogue about nuclear security and its link to combating nuclear 
terrorism.  
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F. DEVELOP CTR BEYOND RUSSIA AND SHUTTER OBSOLETE 
PROGRAMS 
Souring of relations with Russia is a setback for U.S. nonproliferation efforts. 
Deteriorating cooperation and communication has resulted in an increasingly muddied 
picture of Moscow’s nuclear security conditions. One result of this is growing 
uncertainties about Russia’s revived nuclear programs, which will ultimately force U.S. 
security experts to expend time and resources to supplement data that had formerly been 
shared by Russia. The collapse of the CTR with Russia decreases mutual transparency 
and ultimately leads to suspicion about intentions and capabilities. Efforts to restore CTR 
with Russia should continue.  
That being said, efforts to expand CTR activities beyond its bilateral origins have 
already begun. Threat reduction practitioners, now with decades of experience, can now 
refocus existing resources once earmarked for Russia toward the MENA and Asia. 
Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence are a potential boon to future efforts as they 
represent a regionally based national willingness to incorporate cooperative 
nonproliferation activities into their government. The center of excellence in China is a 
particularly important example as it provides a springboard for promoting U.S.-China 
nuclear security efforts. Furthermore, the Four-Year Effort and the NSS have established 
momentum that can lend itself to future CTR activities.  
The ultimate challenge becomes smartly exploiting years of CTR experience 
within the U.S. nuclear security enterprise without maintaining expensive functions that 
may no longer be relevant to current security challenges. Organizational self-interest in 
perpetuating programs often may claim continued relevance but may promote inefficient 
activities—gains being far outweighed by cost. Federal decision makers and nuclear 
security experts must constantly adjust to determine what capabilities may have been 
uniquely suited for post-Soviet activities, which can translate to current realities, and 
which merit mothballing until a later date. 
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G. FINAL WORDS 
Maintaining a nonproliferation regime capable of thwarting nuclear terrorism is, 
ultimately, the product of competing national priorities. Presidential time and effort 
translates into funding and support—domestically and abroad. Nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation are cross cutting team sports requiring broad interagency 
contributions. While all risk cannot be eliminated, preventing nuclear terrorism can be 
successful with sustained programs that address the multiple parts of the issue. The 
alternative of focusing on consequence management is not acceptable.  
Prioritizing nuclear security remains a necessity if the world hopes to continue 
enjoying a history free of nuclear terrorism. It remains on the shoulders of the 
administration, however, to do so smartly and effectively using the lessons learned from 
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